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SUMMARY  
 
Since the advent of the new democratic order established under the 1996 Constitution, 
South Africa has been plagued with many new challenges .One of the facts that our new 
democratic state could not ignore was the rapid increase in both national and 
international,   organized criminal activity .The South African Legislature realizing the 
desire to combat serious criminal activities, introduced into South African Law, the 
Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998. The Act recognizes that conventional 
criminal penalties are inadequate as measures of deterrence when organized crime 
leaders are able to retain the considerable gains derived from organized crime, even on 
those occasions when they are brought to justice. It strives to strip sophisticated 
criminals of the proceeds of their criminal conduct. The Courts, in applying this 
legislation, has also created a new field of law that had until the advent of the Act, not 
existed in South African Law, namely organized crime law. A field, distinct from the 
ordinary principles of criminal law. The bulk of jurisprudence created over the past 
decade or more, however seems to be threatened to be undone by the recent judgment 
concerning the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act. The confirmation of this 
judgment is being considered by the Constitutional Court and the purpose of this thesis 
is to argue against the confirmation of this judgment 
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      CHAPTER 1  
 
                                  GENERAL INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1.Introduction 
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the current substantive approach that exist in 
adjudicating matters, secondly to examine the jurisprudence that exist in respect of 
selected sections and chapters of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act1 and argue 
convincingly that the judgment in Savoi and others v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and another2, from an interpretative viewpoint is flawed. This Chapter 
briefly deals with a few general aspects regarding the dissertation itself. 
 
1.2.Summary of the Problem 
 
The first applicant was the chairman of the various companies in a group of companies, 
while the first respondent was the National Director of Public Prosecutions (“NDPP”). 
The applicants were charged with racketeering, fraud, corruption, money laundering and 
infringement of the Public Management Act in various courts in the country. In the 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 54 charges had been preferred against the applicants. 
It was alleged that the first and second applicants conspired in different ways with highly 
placed officials within provincial administration, so to secure contracts by unlawful 
means for the provision of water purification and oxygen plants. 
In the present proceedings, the applicants sought an order declaring the definitions of 
“pattern of racketeering activity” and “enterprise” in section 1 and Chapter 2 of the POCA 
unconstitutional and invalid on various grounds. Essentially it was argued that the 
definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” was vague and therefore void for 
vagueness and, that the definition of “enterprise” was overbroad, and as a consequence 
both definitions were in breach of the principle of legality and hence unconstitutional 
 
                                                 
1 Prevention of Organized Crime Act 121 of 1998, POCA 
2 [2013] JOL 30466 (KZP) 
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The court found that the doctrine of vagueness is founded on the rule of law, particularly 
on the principles of fair notice to citizens and limitation of enforcement discretion. Void 
for vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one 
could not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed. It is a 
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions 
are not clearly defined. In the present case, upon proper construction the definition of 
“pattern of racketeering activity” in section 1 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act is 
not vague, but clear and precise, instead. It adequately warns an accused that an on-
going and continuous or repeated commission of more than one criminal act listed in 
Schedule 1 will expose him to conviction on a charge of a more serious offence of 
racketeering. 
Over breadth refers to a principle that “governmental purpose to control or prevent 
activities constitutionally subject to State regulation may not be achieved by means 
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of constitutionally 
protected freedom”. Over breadth requires that the means used to achieve a State 
object is too sweeping to attain the object and thereby infringe some protected right. The 
court found that section 2(1)(a)(ii); (b)(ii); (c)(ii) and (f)(ii) of the Act did fall foul of the 
over breadth doctrine, and had to be declared unconstitutional 
 
The problem with the judgment of Savoi 3 , is the drastic repercussions it has, in respect 
of not only Chapter 2, but Chapter 3 ,4, 5 and 6 of POCA. POCA’s   preamble 
recognizes that South African criminal common law and statutory law, fails to deal 
effectively with organized crime, etc. If the illogical reasoning of the Savoi4- judgment is 
to be accepted, it would not only be contrary to the jurisprudence that exists in respect of 
POCA, but also seriously hamper the effective combating of crime.  
 
The state is required to firstly prove knowledge as defined in Section 1 (2) of POCA. The 
state will have to tender, firstly evidence that the accused had actual conscious 
knowledge. Alternatively, if the state fails to prove that the accused had actual conscious 
knowledge of a fact, the state will have to prove to the court satisfaction that-  
(i) The person believes that there is a reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact; 
and  
                                                 
3 Savoi(n 2) 
4 Savoi(n 2) 
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(ii) He or she fails to obtain information to confirm the existence of that fact.  
 
For purposes of POCA, if the state proves the above, this will also suffice as knowledge. 
If the state fails to prove knowledge, in either forms, the provisions of POCA assists the 
state with the presumption of “ought reasonably to have known”. Should the state be 
able to prove the requirements of Section 1(3) of POCA, the rebuttable legal 
presumption that the accused ought reasonably to have known will apply, until the 
accused rebuts.  
 
I submit that in all these scenarios the state still bears the burden to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt the elements of the offence and that each of these concepts which the 
state may be able to rely on in proving the offence of racketeering, still require that 
judicial findings be made. 
  
If the reasoning of the Savoi5- judgment is confirmed it will undo the objectives of the 
POCA , contained in the Preamble, which provides : 
 
“WHEREAS the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 
108 of 1996), enshrines the rights of all people in the Republic and affirms the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom;  
AND WHEREAS the Constitution places a duty on the State to respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights;  
AND WHEREAS there is a rapid growth of organised crime, money laundering and criminal 
gang activities nationally and internationally and since organised crime has internationally been 
identified as an international security threat;  
AND WHEREAS organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities infringe on the 
rights of the people as enshrined in the Bill of Rights;  
AND WHEREAS it is the right of every person to be protected from fear, intimidation and 
physical harm caused by the criminal activities of violent gangs and individuals;  
AND WHEREAS organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities, both 
individually and collectively, present a danger to public order and safety and economic stability, 
and have the potential to inflict social damage;  
AND WHEREAS the South African common law and statutory law fail to deal effectively with 
organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities, and also fail to keep pace with 
international measures aimed at dealing effectively with organised crime, money laundering and 
criminal gang activities;  
AND BEARING IN MIND that it is usually very difficult to prove the direct involvement of 
organised crime leaders in particular cases, because they do not perform the actual criminal 
activities themselves, it is necessary to criminalise the management of, and related conduct in 
connection with enterprises which are involved in a pattern of racketeering activity;  
                                                 
5 Savoi (n 2) 
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AND WHEREAS no person convicted of an offence should benefit from the fruits of that or any 
related offence, whether such offence took place before or after the commencement of this Act, 
legislation is necessary to provide for a civil remedy for the restraint and seizure, and confiscation 
of property which forms the benefits derived from such offence;  
AND WHEREAS no person should benefit from the fruits of unlawful activities, nor is any 
person entitled to use property for the commission of an offence, whether such activities or 
offence took place before or after the commencement of this Act, legislation is necessary to 
provide for a civil remedy for the preservation and seizure, and forfeiture of property which is 
derived from unlawful activities or is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of 
an offence;  
AND WHEREAS effective legislative measures are necessary to prevent and combat the 
financing of terrorist and related activities and to effect the preservation, seizure and forfeiture of 
property owned or controlled by, or on behalf of, an entity involved in terrorist and related 
activities;  
AND WHEREAS there is a need to devote such forfeited assets and proceeds to the combating of 
organised crime, money laundering and the financing of terrorist and related activities;  
AND WHEREAS the pervasive presence of criminal gangs in many communities is harmful to 
the well being of those communities, it is necessary to criminalise participation in or promotion of 
criminal gang activities;  
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa,” 
 
Lastly, should the reasoning of the Savoi6- judgment be confirmed, the normal principles 
of criminal law will have to be utilized in matters for which the common law has not 
developed or provides for. Many criminals will escape serious liability based on the 
approach, adopted by the court, in this judgment. I intend to argue that substantive 
reasoning be utilized by the Constitutional Court to ensure that the defectiveness of the 
Savoi7-judgment does not become part of jurisprudence of POCA and that the 
declaration of constitutional invalidity not be confirmed. 
 
1.3. Purpose of the study 
 
There is a need to address the growing and ever expanding phenomenon of organized 
crime. The purpose of the study is to study the threats that organized crime poses to our new 
democratic state founded on human dignity, equality and freedom. Further, to examine the 
intricacies of POCA as the state’s legislative response and measure in combating organized 
crime. Lastly, the purpose of the study is to examine the development of constitutional and 
ordinary interpretation and how the mechanism of the legal interpretative process may be 
utilized by the judiciary to rid the democratic state of organized crime. Applying a value-laden 
                                                 
6 Savoi(n 2) 
7 Savoi (n 2) 
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approach towards interpretation, avoids illogical judgments, like Savoi, advances protection 
of democratic principles. 
 
1.4. Point of Departure and Hypothesis 
 
1.4.1. Point of departure 
 
The point of departure is that since the advent of our new democratic state, 
interpretation of statutes and the constitution, has been and continues to shape our 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The development of 
the interpretative methodology to statutes by the Constitutional Court has been key in 
redefining and determining our values, freedoms and rights .It is also the legal process 
which the CC has  utilized to not only settle, but also clarify with legal certainty, legal 
disputes  
 
In its very first case dealing with the issue of interpretation the CC remarked in S v Zuma 
and others8 : 
“South African courts are indeed enjoined by section 35 of the Constitution to interpret 
Chapter 3 so as “to promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality”, and, where applicable, to have regard to relevant public 
international law. That section also permits our courts to have regard to comparable 
foreign case law. 
 
I am, however, sure that Froneman J, in his reference to the fundamental “mischief” to 
be remedied, did not intend to say that all the principles of law which have hitherto 
governed our courts are to be ignored. Those principles obviously contain much of 
lasting value. Nor, I am equally sure, did the learned Judge intend to suggest that we 
should neglect the language of the Constitution. While we must always be conscious of 
the values underlying the Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written 
instrument. I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have 
a single “objective” meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one’s personal 
                                                 
8 1995(4) BCLR 401 (CC) 
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intellectual and moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the 
Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to. 
 
We must heed Lord Wilberforce’s reminder that even a Constitution is a legal instrument, 
the language of which must be respected. If the language used by the lawgiver is 
ignored in favour of a general resort to “values” the result is not interpretation but 
divination…9” 
 
This dissertation seeks to find is exactly the practical and democratic approach to 
constitutional and ordinary interpretation, which not only the constitution, but the CC has 
mandated. Furthermore,   the practical and democratic approach should utilized to undo 
the potential harm the Savoi-judment threatens to the CC’s jurisprudence by the CC. 
The dissertation concentrates on the proper approach to be taken, to effectively achieve 
the purpose and context of POCA. 
 
1.4.2. Hypothesis 
 
The main hypothesis of this research is that a value-based theory of interpretation which 
must, in terms of section 39(2) “promote the spirit, purport and objects of “the 
fundamental rights encapsulated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution; be utilized to remedy 
the flaws of the Savoi-judgment. Thus, it makes recommendations on how 
 POCA should be interpreted to determine the values underpinning the legislation. 
 
From this main hypothesis, it can be further postulated that such a reform will lead to: 
1. Achievement of POCA principles. 
2. Complying with democratic international obligations. 
3. Effective combating of organized crime. 
4. Protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the members of our democratic   
society against the threat of organized crime.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Zuma, (n 8) 412 
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1.4.3. Framework of dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 focuses on the distinction between substantive reasoning as opposed to 
formal reasoning; the distinction between constitutional and ordinary interpretation and 
the importance of the distinctions. Chapter 3  focuses on the direct and indirect 
application of the Bill of Rights in the interpretative process. Chapter 4 focuses on the 
importance of POCA legislation i.e. by examining two factual examples and how POCA 
can be utilized as opposed to the inadequacies of ordinary principles of criminal law. 
Chapter 5 examines the jurisprudence that has developed under POCA in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal .Chapter 6 examines the jurisprudence that has developed under POCA 
in the Constitutional Court. Chapter 7 examines the international position regarding 
organised crime, as well as some academic views on this topic. Chapter 8 critically 
discusses the Savoi10-judgment, while recommending the approach that should be 
adopted against this judgment.  
 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
This is a descriptive research whereby the South African legal field for organised crime 
will be analysed. The point of departure will be to examine the interpretative 
methodology that exists under the current democratic dispensation, the legislative 
framework in respect of South Africa ,  international treaties . 
Writings and research by academics regarding interpretation will also be studied and 
their different views are analysed and compared. The aim is  to draw a full 
comprehensive conclusion by examining the existing literature, inclusive of text books, 
cases and legislation that exists in this field of study . 
 
 
1.5.1 History 
 
It has been considered useful to examine the historical evolution of organized crime law 
for better understanding. Quite useful is the jurisprudential position regarding POCA that 
has evolved within the two most superior forums in South Africa. Similarly, the rich case 
                                                 
10 Savoi (n 2) 
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history of case law, within the United States, provides valuable insights on how other 
jurisdictions approach organised crime.   
 
1.5.2 Examples 
 
A number of practical examples is presented to give insights into how POCA is applied 
to factual situations, to effectively combat organized crime. It focuses on the criminal 
prosecution of offenders and simultaneously the use of asset forfeiture as a measure of 
prevention and deterrence. 
 
EXAMPLE 1  
This example is an example containing a broad set of facts. It is specifically used to 
illustrate the many useful ways POCA can be utilized to hold offenders accountable, 
both civil and criminal. Each criminal section and sanction can be employed to achieve 
the purpose of the Act. The civil remedies can be used by the State to seize assets and 
profits of organized crime. Various syndicates operate in these set of facts and the 
example shows how the State deals with these types of operations.   
 
EXAMPLE 2 
This example is an example containing set of facts of two primary offenders. It is 
specifically used to illustrate the many useful ways POCA can be utilized to hold 
offenders accountable, who though not directly involved in the initial crimes, somehow 
profits from it. It illustrates how the State can deter other potential offenders from reaping 
the benefits of organized crime, through the application of POCA. 
 
1.6 ACADEMIC VIEWS 
 
The viewpoints of various academic writers are reflected throughout the research. In chapter 
2, the academic writings of various constitutional law writers are used to adequately explain 
the distinction between substantive reasoning as opposed to formal reasoning; the 
distinction between constitutional and ordinary interpretation and the importance of the 
distinctions. 
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The second chapter discusses the direct application of the Bill of Rights and the distinct, 
indirect application of the Bill of Rights and the various legal opinions regarding the 
distinction as well as the values to be promoted and that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The various writers’ 
opinions regarding these aspects, illustrate the distinction and the various approaches 
regarding the distinctions. 
 
In Chapter 7, the academic viewpoints provide valuable insights into the jurisprudence of 
organized crime law. The writer’s opinions give context to both POCA as well as other 
international legislative measures aimed at combating this transnational phenomenon. 
 
1.7 POCA LEGISLATION 
 
For purposes of the dissertation, the context of the legislative measure itself is an 
important factor that must be taken into consideration.  
 
The Act consists of a Preamble and 181 provisions. The Act is divided into 8 chapters 
and 3 schedules. Chapter 1: Definitions and interpretation, provision 1; Chapter 
2:Offences relating to racketeering, provision 2 and 3; Chapter 3:Offences relating to 
proceeds of unlawful activities, provision 4 to 8; Chapter 4: Offences relating to criminal 
gang activities , provision 9 to 11;Chapter 5:Proceeds of unlawful activities, provision 12 
to 36; Chapter 6: Civil recovery of property, provision 37 to 62; Chapter 7 :Criminal 
assets recovery account, provision 63 to 70; Chapter 8: General Provisions, provision 71 
to 81. Schedule 1 contains list of predicate offences relevant to POCA, Schedule 2 
contains amendments to the Drug and Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992, and Schedule 3 
contains amendments to International Co-Operation in Criminal Matters Act. Chapter 5 
consists of 4 parts, i.e. part 1: Application of the chapter, provision 12 to 17; part 2: 
Confiscation orders, provision 18 to 24; part 3: Restraint order, provision 24A to 29 and 
part 4: Realisation of property, provision 30 to 36. Chapter 6 consists of 4 parts, i.e. part 
1: Introduction, provision 37, part 2: preservation of property orders, provision 38 to 47; 
part 3: Forfeiture of property, provision 48 to 57 and part 4: General provisions relating to 
preservation and forfeiture property, 58 to 62. 
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POCA is  generally , divided into two parts. The first part of the Act, Chapter 2 to 4 are 
provisions that are exclusively concerned with the criminal prosecution and sanctions of 
the various forms organized crime, namely racketeering, money laundering and gangs. 
The second part of the Act, chapter 5 to 6 is concerned with the civil recovery of property 
concerned with crime, namely chapter 5 with the recovery of proceeds of criminal 
activities and chapter 6 with forfeiture of property that operates as instrumentality of 
crime.  The first part generally referred to as POCA prosecutions and the second part as 
asset forfeiture law.  
 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Bearing the general introductory aspects of this chapter in mind, I submit that the context 
for this research and remainder of the dissertation has been set. Chapter 2 focuses on 
the distinction between substantive reasoning as opposed to formal reasoning; the 
distinction between constitutional and ordinary interpretation and the importance of the 
distinctions. Chapter 3 briefly focuses on the direct and indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights in the interpretative process. Chapter 4 focuses on the importance of POCA 
legislation i.e. by examining two factual examples and how POCA can be utilized as 
opposed to the inadequacies of ordinary principles of criminal law. Chapter 5 examines 
the jurisprudence that has developed under POCA in the Supreme Court of Appeal 
.Chapter 6 examines the jurisprudence that has developed under POCA in the 
Constitutional Court. Chapter 7 examines the international position regarding organized 
crime, as well as some academic views on this topic. Chapter 8 critically discusses the 
Savoi11-judgment, and concludes as to the approach that should be adopted against this 
judgment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Savoi (n 2) 
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CHAPTER 2 
                            
                           INTERPRETATIVE REASONINGS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will focuses on the distinction between substantive reasoning as 
opposed to formal reasoning; the distinction between constitutional and ordinary 
interpretation and the importance of the distinctions.  
 
 2.2. Substantive reasoning vs. Formal Reasoning 
 
 “At the outset of our democracy, Alfred Cockrell explained that constitutional 
adjudication demanded a new style of substantive reasoning (in contrast to the formal 
reasoning typically associated with law).”12 
 
Upon critical analysis of this statement, Cockrell13 advocates the idea that since the 
advent of the new South African constitutional dispensation, the focal point of 
adjudication within this dispensation, requires a more dynamic and substantive approach 
as opposed to the formalistic reasoning which was the previous approach to adjudicating 
matters. However to fully understand the idea which Cockrell14 advocates, analysis of 
Cockrell’s15 article itself is needed  to understand  the context of this distinction 
between substantive and formal reasoning and why the distinction between the two 
approaches are important to adjudication. Adjudication in general, but more importantly 
constitutional adjudication, which is the main focus of this assignment. If clarity exist 
about the distinction between the approaches, as well as the views which exist 
pertaining to constitutional adjudication, whether or not one agrees with Cockrell’s16 
view is a question simplified. 
 
                                                 
12Alfred Cockrell  “Rainbow Jurisprudence”(1996)South African Journal on Human    
   Rights 1-38  
13Cockrell(n 12) 
14 Cockrell(n 12) 
15 Cockrell(n 12) 
16 Cockrell(n 12) 
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It is to be noted from the outset that the purpose of this entire analysis is to determine 
whether to agree or disagree with Cockrell17 in respect of the approaches regarding 
constitutional adjudication and what the basis is for either viewpoint. 
 
In this respect I submit that this analysis of constitutional adjudication will originate  
from the Constitution18 itself, placed in context by the Preamble, Section 2 and 
specifically section 39 of the Constitution. Section 2 provides:  
 
“This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it 
is invalid and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.” Section 39(1) states “(1) 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- (a)   must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom;(b)   must consider international law; and(c)   may consider foreign law.” 
 
 I submit that the Constitution requires, as the supreme law of the Republic, that when 
constitutional adjudication is being exercised by the court, tribunal or forum must do so 
in terms of  section 39 of the Constitution. 
 
Cockrell19 states his views as follow “My aim in this article is a more general one, 
inasmuch as I hope to provide an assessment of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Court as contained in the judgments which were handed down in the course of 
1995.20”He furthers his aim with the distinction between substantive and formal 
reasoning by stating “A substantive reason is a moral, economic, political, institutional or 
other social consideration21….A formal reason, in contrast, is a legal authoritative reason 
on which judges are required to base a decision and which overrides any countervailing 
substantive reason arising at the point of application”22. He sums up his view and 
contentions by stating “..prior to the coming into operation of the interim bill of rights, the 
South African legal tradition was dominated by a formal vision of law in which the hard 
edges of legal rules were seen to screen off consideration of substantive reasons. 
Chapter 3 of the 1993 Constitution effectively ‘opens up’ the judicial role, since the 
                                                 
17 Cockrell(n 12) 
18 108 of 1996 
19 Cockrell (n 12) 
20 Cockrell (n 12)5 
21 Cockrell (n 12)5 
22 Cockrell (n 12)5 
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validity of legal rules is now made to depend in part on compliance with substantive 
criteria. Those who seek to interpret Chapter 3 of the Constitution must of necessity go 
behind the textual rule and engage with the substantive reasons which are incorporated 
therein. This is no cosmetic change, but a paradigm shift with profound implications.”23 
 
If one analyses the verbatim of the text of section 39 of the Constitution, one is inclined 
to agree with the view as advanced by Cockrell. It is quite clear that an adjudicator will 
have to make determinations, as to what  the values of that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom are, must consider 
international law; and may consider foreign law. These considerations require moral, 
economic, political, etc. in order to fully comply with the requirements of Section 39. 
 
However, I submit that a full analysis also entails the distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and ordinary interpretation and the views regarding these aspects. 
 
2.3. Constitutional interpretation vs. ordinary interpretation 
 
The analysis starts with the position regarding the interpretive measures that currently 
exist, in our constitutional state, in respect of the Constitution, its provisions as well as all 
other law. In light of requirements of section 2 and the Preamble24, the relevant 
constitutional provision is section 3925, as already stated above 
 
 Botha26 distinguishes between constitutional interpretation and ordinary statutory 
interpretation as follow “Section 39(2) of the Constitution prescribes the ‘filtering’ of 
legislation through the fundamental rights during the ‘ordinary’ interpretation process. 
Constitutional interpretation refers to the authoritative interpretation of the supreme 
Constitution by the judiciary during the judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation 
and government action. Du Plessis & Corder(1994:88) point out that the differences 
between constitutional and ordinary interpretation must not be over-emphasized. Both 
deal with the interpretation of legislative instruments. Because both forms of legislative 
interpretation are interrelated, it is preferable that both are members of the same broad 
                                                 
23 Cockrell (n 12)10 
24 The Constitution of 1996 
25 The Constitution of 1996 
26Botha Christo “Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students” (4th edn, 2005) 
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interpretive family27….further that “The difference between constitutional and ordinary 
interpretation was explained by Froneman J in Matiso v Commanding Officer,Port 
Elizabeth Prison(above)597G-H 
‘ The interpretation of the Constitution will be directed at ascertaining the foundational 
values inherent in the Constitution, whilst the interpretation of the particular legislation 
will be directed at ascertaining whether that legislation is capable of an interpretation 
which conforms with the fundamental values or principles of the Constitution28.’  ”  
 
Botha29 then states that “What does the Constitution say about its own interpretation? 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution provides the following with regard to interpretation of 
the Bill of Rights….The first part is peremptory: when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a 
court, tribunal or forum must make value judgments …and must have regard to 
international law…Furthermore, a court, tribunal or forum may also refer to foreign law 
when interpreting the Bill of Rights…The interpretation clause must be read with the 
supremacy clause as well as section 1. Section 1 is arguably one of the most important 
provisions in the Supreme Constitution The Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values:  (a)   Human dignity, 
the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms.(b)   Non-racialism and non-sexism.(c)   Supremacy of the constitution 
and the rule of law.(d)   Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll, 
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.30 
 
I submit that it is quite clear from Botha’s view not only the distinction between 
constitutional interpretation and ordinary interpretation, but also that the values 
contained in section 1 of the Constitution, are to be promoted, as required by section 
39.The values are also contained in section 1 of the Constitution, thus guidance as to 
which values are to be promoted in our democracy are prescribed by the legislative text 
of the Constitution itself. 
 
                                                 
27Botha(n 26)114 
28Botha(n 26)114 
29Botha(n 26) 
30Botha(n 26)116-117  
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Devenish31 contends that “The Constitution mandates a value-based theory of 
interpretation, as set out in section 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution, which specifically 
addresses the complex issue of constitutional interpretation. In so doing, it must develop, 
according to section 39(1) of the Constitution, the values that underpin an open and 
democratic society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom; must consider 
international law and may consider foreign law. However it is important to note that the 
principles of international human rights law and foreign law must be interpreted and 
applied with due regard for the South African context and the values found in our 
Constitution. The process of interpretation, although taking into account both 
international and foreign law must start and end with the South African 
Constitution….The emphasis is therefore on certain cardinal values, which the 
Constitution requires must be given expression to in the process of interpretation. It is in 
these values that the methodology and jurisprudence of interpretation find their 
inspiration and application .It should be noted that the ambit of section 39 is not 
restricted to the interpretation of Chapter 2 of the Constitution. This is manifestly clear 
from section 39(2)….Interpretation giving expression to fundamental values requires the 
following methodology as set out by Langa J in the Hyundai case: ‘ The Constitution 
requires that the judicial officers read legislation, where possible, in ways which give 
effect to its fundamental values. Consistent with this, when the constitutionality of 
legislation is in issue, they are under a duty to examine the objects and purport of an Act 
and to read the provisions of the legislation, so far as is possible, in conformity with the 
Constitution’.”32He states further that “…it is submitted that “purposivism” or the 
purposive approach in a narrow sense, should not be accepted as a general theory of 
interpretation in South Africa because it can neglect certain critically important values. 
What is required is a values-based theory of interpretation which must, in terms of 
section 39(2) ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects’ of  the fundamental rights 
encapsulated in Chapter 2 of the Constitution. The word ‘spirit’ which is used in 
conjunction with the words ‘purport and objects’ clearly indicates that we are dealing with 
a method of interpretation that is wider and more comprehensive than that of the 
purposive approach….What is required is a disciplined process of teleological and moral 
evaluation, bearing in mind that the function of a judge in a system involving 
                                                 
31Devenish GE “The theory and Methodology of Constitutional Interpretation in South Africa”(2006) 
THRHR) 238-258   
32 Devenish(n 19)238-240 
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fundamental values must inevitably be an essentially moral one. Therefore it is clear that 
the curial interpretation in many circumstances of human rights, which are broadly 
conceived and formulated with a high degree of abstraction must involve ‘an overt value 
judgment, amounting to an act of creation and imagination’, making use of deontic as 
well as inductive and deductive reasoning  . 
…Therefore in an interpretative conflict the core values of, inter alia, equality, freedom 
and dignity, should triumph over a particular purpose inferred from a specific provision of  
the Constitution, thereby rendering the interpretation compatible with the overall purpose 
of the Constitution as a whole , as a constitution of liberty. This does not mean that the 
language is unimportant, but that the language of the text must be balanced and 
qualified by the contextual and jurisprudential considerations. What is required is an 
open- ended process of elucidation and commentary which explores and attaches 
significance to every word, section or clause in relation to the whole context and ethos of 
the Constitution.  
The use of a values-based approach does not mean that a particular purpose of a 
section of the Constitution is irrelevant, but that it should not be regarded as necessarily 
determinant, and therefore that it should be considered as one factor, albeit an important 
one, in the process of teleological evaluation, used in the methodology of interpretation, 
which should be dynamic and involve an unqualified contextual approach to both the 
language and jurisprudence of the Constitution. 
  
….Finally there is another important reason why a value –based interpretation is 
preferable to a purposive one. The 1996 Constitution itself mandates such interpretation, 
as indicated as above. This is clear from; inter alia, first, the preamble…Furthermore 
section 1…Lastly in this regard section 39(1). 
 
A generous interpretation may in certain circumstances prove to be too wide, and a 
purposive one too narrow. Both these methods of interpretation can be defective in that 
they tend to be one-dimensional. Furthermore, the Bill of Rights includes universal moral 
and ethical values and therefore has in its application and its interpretation and important 
moral dimension to it. It is for this reason, it is submitted, that a values-based theory of 
interpretation is the most satisfactory one...”33 The learned author then continues to 
discuss an approach taking cognizance of various factors such as the language, context, 
                                                 
33 Devenish(n 31)240-242 
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history of the Constitution, in a liberal manner, irrespective of whether it is constitutional 
interpretation or ordinary interpretation. 
 
De Waal, et al34 defines constitutional interpretation as well as its stages. They submit 
that “Constitutional interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of a 
constitutional provision. More narrowly, for the purposes of Bill of Rights cases, the aim 
of interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of a provision in the Bill of Rights in order to 
establish whether law or conduct is inconsistent with that provision the aim of 
interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of a provision in the Bill of Rights in order to 
establish whether law or conduct is inconsistent with that provision. Interpretation 
therefore involves two enquiries: first the meaning or scope of a right must be 
determined, and then it must be determined whether the challenged law or conduct 
conflicts with the right. This chapter is principally concerned with the first of these 
enquiries-determining the meaning of the rights in the Bill of Rights…..The second 
enquiry-whether law or conduct is in conflict with a right-involves the interpretation of the 
challenged law or determination of  what the challenged conduct amounts to or what its 
effects are. Thereafter one must determine whether there is a conflict between the law 
and the Bill of Rights. 
 
…What then are the rules, principles and methods that apply to the interpretation of the 
Constitution? The Constitution itself does not prescribe how it should be interpreted. 
Section 39 contains an interpretation clause which pertains to the Bill of Rights and s239 
contains certain definitions which apply to the interpretation of the Constitution as a 
whole. However these instructions contained in s39, important as they may be , are 
themselves sufficiently abstract to require a great deal of interpretation. As for s239, it 
defines only three terms: ‘national legislation’, ‘organ of state’ and ‘provincial legislation’. 
Because the interpretation, application and limitation of fundamental rights is not( indeed 
cannot be) regulated completely by the text of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
has laid down guidelines as to how the Constitution in general and the Bill of Rights in 
particular should be interpreted..”35 The learned authors then continue to discuss 
several of the guidelines 
                                                 
34 Johan De Waal, Ian Currie and Gerhard Erasmus “The Bill of Rights Handbook” (5th ed,2005)145-   
    162 
35 Ibid 145-147 
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Although not stating it pertinently, the learned authors discuss the various approaches 
the Constitutional Court has taken in constitutional interpretation, with the objective of 
determining the values underlying the Constitution.. This is quite obvious from the 
heading under which the discussion of the topic takes place, namely “THE POINT OF 
INTERPRETATION: A GENEROUS AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION THAT 
GIVES EXPRESSION TO THE UNDERLYING VALUES OF THE CONSTITUTION” 
This objective is exactly what section 39(1)(a) requires. They continue to discuss the 
various cases decided by the Constitutional Court, with reference to the role of the text, 
purposive interpretation, generous interpretation, a contextual approach. 
 
The learned authors then continue to briefly discuss their views about the interpretation 
clause. To be noted is the following: “Section 39(1) requires an interpretation that 
promotes the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. It seems that the society referred to is not necessarily the 
current South African is analogous to that of ascertaining the boni mores or legal 
convictions of the community in the law of delict. Despite the importance of the context, 
the everyday realities of South African society will therefore not feature as much in the 
interpretative stage of fundamental rights analysis, when the scope of the right is 
determined. They may prove to be decisive at the stage when the constitutionality of 
limitations of the rights is considered.”36 
 
In respect of section 39(2) they remark “Section 39(2) has little to do with the 
interpretation of the Constitution, but concerns the interpretation of the statutes and the 
development of the common law and customary law. While the section does not concern 
the ‘interpretation’ of the Constitution, it is crucial to the ‘application’ of the Constitution. 
Section 39(2) should therefore be read with s8-the application clause-since it provides 
for indirect application (sometimes called ‘the permeating effect’) of the Bill of Rights to 
the law.37” 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid 159 
37 Ibid 161 
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2.4. Conclusion 
 
These authors all are ad idem that since the advent of the Constitution, interpretation of 
the constitution cannot be based on legislative intent. Quite clearly the interpretation 
clause itself requires that when adjudicating a matter, the adjudicator must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom. Further the values of the Republic of South Africa are spelled out in 
section 1 of the Constitution.  The correct approach and manner of interpretation is not 
prescribed, but principles and guidelines as to interpretation whether it applies directly or 
indirectly is to be sought from the Constitutional Courts approach to interpretation in the 
case law dealing with constitutional issues. It is however, quite clear that more than 
legislative intent is required if an adjudicator is not only required to promote the values of 
a society when adjudicating, but also to observe foreign law and international law. This 
aspect of interpretation is important for support of the argument that the Savoi-judment is 
legally flawed. The point of departure is Section 39 of the Constitution, directing the 
approach to be taken. Irrespective of whether the Bill of Rights is interpreted in terms of 
Section 39(1) or ordinary legislation in terms of Section 39(2),  I agree with the approach 
advanced by Devenish and submit that the value-laden approach is not only reflected in 
the jurisprudence of POCA, but is exactly the approach that is mandated by our 
Constitution in respect of both itself and ordinary legislation, as well as the CC38. Having 
regard to what is set out above, this approach adequately takes cognizance that our 
system of justice is underpinned by constitutional values and principles which has 
fairness, as their objective. Apparent from the chapters that follow is the underlying aim 
of the POCA legislation is to protect and preserve our democratic society from the 
scourge of criminal elements which are seeking to use and manipulate these rights and 
freedoms for criminal gains. These fundamental rights and freedoms are highly prized 
and it is of the utmost importance that they be protected. It cannot be ignored or wished 
away that criminals will devise ingenious methods to circumvent the protection of these 
rights. The normal principles of ordinary criminal law is ill-equip to deal with the new 
forms of crime and are too far under developed to address these injustices. The 
legislature has recognized this threat and responded with POCA as the means to 
combat these threats. I submit it is therefore of the utmost importance that the correct 
interpretation in respect of this valuable legislation is adopted, so that the juristic 
                                                 
38 Zuma(n 8) at Paras [15]-[16] at 651H-I and 651J-652A 
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community can contribute meaningfully to the eradication of the phenomenon of 
organized crime.   This can only be done if the approach adopted is that POCA states its 
objective in its preamble, i.e. that POCA is the state’s means to fulfil its constitutional 
obligation protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights .The Bill of Rights in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), which enshrines 
the rights of all people in the Republic and affirms the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.  
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                  CHAPTER 3 
                                  
APPLICATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
 In this chapter I will briefly discuss the direct application of the Bill of Rights and the 
distinct, indirect application of the Bill of Rights and the various legal opinions regarding 
the distinction, as well as the values to be promoted and that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
3.2. Direct application 
 
The direct application of the Bill of Rights, as is quite clear from above requires, that an 
adjudicator must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Further the values of the Republic of 
South Africa are spelled out in section 1 of the Constitution. However there exist quite a 
number of views as to what these values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, are and how they are to be promoted. 
I submit that in respect of interpretation, with regards to direct application, I am inclined 
to agree with the submissions advanced by Devenish39 as the correct approach. In 
respect of interpretation seeking to advance the values, spirit and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights, various academic writers have divergent theories as to the values and manner in 
which these values are to be determined and advanced .I submit  a proper analysis 
requires that one look at some of these views. 
 
Bohler-Muller40  argues that one of the fundamental shortcomings of the legal system 
under the current democratic state is the inability to adopt an ethical responsibility which 
would lead to more informed decision-making. She advocates the idea of storytelling, 
                                                 
39Devenish (, n 31) 
40Narnia Bohler-Muller  “Beyond Legal Narratives: the interrelationship between    
   storytelling, ubuntu and care”(2005) Stellenbosch Law Review 133 
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ubuntu and care as an alternative of fostering an ethical responsibility, an idea she 
argues ,which is lacking in our legal system. 
 
She argues  for the adoption of a "jurisprudence of care", which potentially shifts the 
emphasis towards context and away from concerns about precedents of universal 
application. The importance should be focusing on life stories before the courts. A 
jurisprudence of care demands that all circumstances be considered and all  be heard 
before making a judgment that is the least harmful to the most vulnerable entity.41 It is 
quite clear  that Bohler-Muller42 advances the argument that in our legal system, legal 
adjudication is inadequate. She submits that by contributing ubuntu and storytelling to 
courts in the interpretive process, courts will in a jurisprudence of care listen to all 
circumstances before reaching conclusions which are the least damaging to the most 
vulnerable of parties. In this manner values such as equity will become more real 
concepts than static universal abstracts. The values that she advances as values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
are ubuntu , storytelling to courts and jurisprudence of care. 
 
Botha H43 states “I argue that the reflective use of metaphors can help South African 
lawyers to break with the essentialism and reductionism of apartheid legal thought, 
transform legal theory and practice, and imagine more humane futures. I analyze some 
of the metaphors which structured apartheid legal thought, as well as a number of 
metaphors which have been used to describe rights, constitutionalism and interpretation 
under the new constitutional order. I argue that these examples suggest both the 
persistence of old ways of seeing and thinking, and the possibility of using metaphors 
reflectively, of transforming legal thought, of imagining alternative worlds.44”  
 
Botha H45 states “The South African constitution requires lawyers to abandon the 
formalism, objectivism and reductionism which characterized law under apartheid. It 
requires them to reconceive notions like individual rights, the rule of law, democracy, 
                                                 
41 ibid 134 
42 Bohler-Muller(n.40 ) 
43 Henk Botha “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism: Part 1”   
   (2002) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 612”  
44 Ibid 613 
45 Botha H “Metaphoric reasoning and transformative constitutionalism: Part 2”   
   (2003) Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 20 
 32 
intergovernmental relations and the separation of powers in less essentialist terms; to 
reconceptualise the relationship between law and politics, the individual and society, 
private and public law, and common law and legislation in ways that transcend the 
dichotomies and hierarchies which characterized apartheid law. The constitution, in my 
understanding, seeks to uphold the rule of law without postulating a rigid division 
between law and politics. It entrenches fundamental individual rights, but does not 
entrench an abstract individualism which sees the individual as prior to and detached 
from the society in which she lives.  It is committed to the separation of powers, but not 
to the idea of strict boundaries between the legislature, executive and judiciary. It 
provides for a division of authority among the national, provincial and local spheres of 
government, but characterizes the relationship between the different spheres as one of 
co-operation, rather than a strict division or hierarchy. The constitution also relativises 
the distinction between private law and public law and between common law and 
legislation.”46 Further the learned author state: “ The constitution does not seek to 
entrench rigid boundaries between the individual and collective, but requires us to 
structure social relationships in a way that is conducive to the dignity, equality and 
freedom of all. It stresses the importance of co-operation and dialogue in the relationship 
among different organs of state, and requires the entire legal system to be harmonised 
with the constitution.”47 The learned author then continues to advocates the notion that if 
the legal profession utilizes the idea of rights as relationships and dialogue, while 
metaphors of balancing and rights as categories far more transformation can be 
achieved. Metaphors can be constantly re- interpreted and thus advance constitutional 
adjudication. 
 
From Botha H48 point of view, it seems the legal concepts of the rule of law, the 
separation of powers , the spirit of co-operative government, as well as the 
entrenchment of fundamental individual rights are the values , that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. Further utilizing 
metaphors is a means to advance constitutional adjudication 
 
                                                 
46 Ibid 20-21 
47 Ibid 21 
48 Botha H (n 43) 
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Currie49 while referring to Cockrell’s50 view, points out that a herculean model at its 
extreme, as advocated by Cockrell51 would not be realistic and practical. He points out 
the advantages of “judicial avoidance” by the Constitutional Court of certain issues. He 
states “Two observations can be made about the Constitutional Court’s 1998 output. The 
first is that, for a full-time multi-member court, its caseload is not onerous. A second 
observation is that a substantial proportion of the judgments that were handed down in 
1998 involved procedural issues…a sparse roll is a luxury. It allows for a depth of 
research and reflection on a decision that a more pressed courts do not have. These are 
the ideal conditions for the style and method of adjudication practiced by Ronald 
Dworkin’s ideal type of the judge- Hercules…Time and talent, according to Dworkin, 
combine to make Hercules judgments masterpieces of comprehensiveness, synthesis 
and theoretical depth, with justification drawn from the most philosophical reaches of 
political theory… Furthermore “behind Cockrell’s disappointment with the Court’s 
theoretical timidity, lies a particular vision of constitutional adjudication. According to 
Cockrell the constitutional ‘paradigm shift’ in 1994 required a new style of adjudication. 
While a ‘formal vision of law’ and dominated legal thinking and practice prior to 1994, the 
interim Constitution had brought its reign to an end. It was supplanted by a substantive 
vision of law…The idea that constitutional adjudication requires the courts to unlearn 
their habits of formal reasoning and substitute them with first-order theoretical 
justification inclines towards the adjudicative model described above as ‘Herculean’. 
Hercules decides cases on the basis of making the legal text the best it can possible be, 
a constructive interpretation of a community’s legal practice. Constructive interpretation 
means the hard work of developing a consistent and coherent set of principles which 
most adequately justify and make sense of our intuitive moral judgments. This obviously 
requires a great deal of theoretical self-consciousness and high abstraction. Herculean 
judges practice a jurisprudence of considerable theoretical ambition, aiming to find 
comprehensive legal, moral, philosophical and economic justifications for a decision. 
Besides comprehensiveness, Herculean theorizing aims at generality-the development 
of general principles determining not only a particular outcome on a concrete case but, 
at its limit, also explaining the entire record of past and future decisions. But to urge  
Herculeanism on the Constitutional Court greatly overstates both the incidence and 
                                                 
49 Ian Currie “Judicious Avoidance(1999)South African Journal on Human Rights 138- 
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50Cockrell ( n 12) 
51Cockrell (n 12) 
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importance of first –order moral and political theorizing in constitutional adjudication. The 
Court decides cases on the basis of the first principles infrequently, relying instead 
where it can on deductive reasoning by reference to formal rules and analogies with the 
decided cases and foreign jurisprudence. This is not to deny that substantive reasoning 
is, on occasion, necessary. It in concrete cases of abstract and open-ended standards 
such as ‘unfair discrimination’ or a society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.’ But a full-blown Herculean model of adjudication is simply too heroic to 
provide an accurate means of measuring the Court’s rather more cautious performance. 
It fails to account for the habits of avoidance that the Court has acquired52” Currie53 then 
continues to state “ One will find very little Herculeanism in the Constitutional Court’s 
recent output .The Court has settled instead on a characteristic style of decision making 
that is the opposite of Herculean: cautious, incremential, particularistic and theoretically 
modest. In support of its minimalist style of jurisprudence the Court can draw on a 
repertoire that the Court has energetically elaborated over the past five years. These are 
the rules of justiciability and the procedural rules allowing the Court to decide not to 
decide a case54” .The learned author then continues illustrate his point by referring to the 
Courts decisions of  Ferreira v Levin No55, Case v Minister of Safety and Security56, 
National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice57. He concludes by 
stating that “To say that the Constitutional Court decides cases in much the same way 
as any other Court(cautiously ,incrementally, emphasizing the particular rather the 
general, avoiding large-scale theorizing and relying instead on incompletely reasoned 
agreements) is only controversial if one thinks constitutional adjudication to be a grander 
and more heroic enterprise than ordinary adjudication. Even if the stakes are higher in 
constitutional adjudication, the consequences of a decision more far-reaching, this 
mandates more caution rather than less.58” 
 
Currie’s view simply states that although he concedes that a new style of substantive 
reasoning in respect of constitutional adjudication is required by the Constitution, the 
model as envisioned by Cockrell is idealistic and impractical. The approach as taken by 
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the Constitutional Court should be continued, avoiding overcomplicated decisions, were 
matters can be decided with the avoidance of a multitude of issues.  
 
De Vos59 argues the view that the metaphor of the Constitution as a bridge from the 
apartheid system to an idealistic democratic society, may be of high value as a tool of 
interpretation in general. He introduces this notion through the theory of the grand 
narrative as employed by the Constitutional Court. He states that “While it is difficult to 
claim that the Constitutional Court has a developed a clear and unambiguous approach 
to the interpretation of the interim and 1996 Constitutions in general or even of the Bill of 
Rights, it is safe to say that, apart from its use of traditional methods of interpretation to 
signal the “legal”(as opposed to ‘political’) nature of its task, the Court has developed 
what can loosely be termed a ‘contextual’ approach to constitutional interpretation…The 
contextual approach to constitutional approach to constitutional interpretation employed 
by the Court is a complex and multifaceted endeavour. It is consequently beyond the 
scope of this article to describe and analyse it in full. Rather, this article focuses on the 
use of what may be termed a ‘grand  narrative’ or ‘super context’ about South Africa’s 
constitutional order in the interpretation of its successive democratic Constitutions. This 
‘grand narrative’ has been and continues to be , constructed by the jurisprudence of the 
Constitutional Court ,and in turn plays an important role in construction of the scope and 
the content of the 1996 Constitution. The creation ,maintenance and deployment of this 
grand narrative constitutes an ambitious attempt to situate (almost) any understanding of 
the constitutional text within the context of a universally accepted structuring , meaning –
giving story about the origins and purpose of the interim and 1996 constitutions. The 
Court deploys this grand narrative in an attempt to limit the appearance of its own 
agency in the interpretative project and to assist it in ‘discovering’ (what some judges 
seem to believe is) a relatively fixed and determinable meaning60…It could then be 
argued  that , while  many of the  provisions in the constitutional text do not have one 
objective meaning ,and while the meaning of the text (often) depends on the context (or 
at least the major tenets of such a context)61..The text of the Constitution may not 
always have one objective meaning ,so it is said ,but if we read it in the context of our 
history it will pretty much tell us what we want to know without our having recourse to our 
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own personal, political or philosophical views62…The idea of the interim Constitution as 
a link between a dark ,apartheid past and a bright, human-rights based future has been 
embraced by the Constitutional Court and now forms the basis for the ‘grand narrative’ 
within which the interpretation of both the interim and 1996 Constitutions is usually 
situated63….The notion of the Constitution as a bridge has thus become a powerful 
metaphor in constitutional adjudication. In terms of this scheme  , the text reference to 
their historical context. In other words, the meaning of the text can (at least partly) be 
discovered  with reference to South Africa’s recent past because the Constitution were 
designed precisely to guide our society in its movement away from the past…The term is 
“past’ is used here in at least two distinct but interrelated ways. First  ,it refers to the 
actions and events associated with the implementation of apartheid and the inhuman 
,unequal and repressive conditions that came to exist under this system… The second 
refers to the manner in which South Africa has moved away from the apartheid system 
towards a new constitutional state64…The Constitutional Court uses these references to 
the ‘past’ interchangeably, depending on the context of the case before it65.  The learned 
author however concludes that the historical context may however be problematic 
depending on which view of history the judges as individuals choose to accept. 
 
In respect of the views advanced by Cockrell66, I submit that his views have already 
been canvassed in preceding paragraphs. However it should be mentioned that despite 
advocating the substantive style of reasoning, he criticizes the Constitutional Courts lack 
of substantive reasoning at that stage of constitutional jurisprudence. He specifically 
analyses a number of judgments to illustrate his criticism. As already stated Currie67 
differs from his view, terming his envisioned ‘shift in paradigm’ as a tendency towards 
Dworkin’s herculean judge, which is an impractical approach. 
 
3.3 Indirect application 
 
In respect of indirect interpretation, the jurisprudence discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, in 
respect of selected sections and Chapters of   POCA will indicate the type of reasoning 
                                                 
62 Ibid 10 
63 Ibid 11 
64 Ibid 11 
65 Ibid 12 
66 Cockrell (n 12) 
67 Currie (n 11) 
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the Supreme Court of Appeal as well as the Constitutional Court applies during the 
interpretive process. The jurisprudence in respect of these rights clearly illustrates the 
courts interpretive methodology ensuring that the   prosecutions, forfeiture and conduct 
comply with the values and spirit of the Chapter 2 (Bill of Rights).  These issues will be 
canvassed, with discussion of the jurisprudence of POCA. However, as will become 
apparent from the discussion of the jurisprudence of POCA, the indirect application of 
the Bill of Rights , with reference to the views by above-mentioned authors, that the 
tendency of the courts are to adopt an approach that protects and shields the 
fundamental rights listed in the Bill of Rights. This approach is not with specific reference 
to protection of the fundamental rights of the accused, i.e property rights, fair trial rights, 
right to privacy, etc., but a balancing act, aimed at the protection of the values and 
freedoms of a democratic state based on freedom, equality and human dignity against 
the threat of organised crime. The freedoms and rights of an individual in our democratic 
society will always remain of paramount importance, especially where an individual is 
accused of committing offenses. It is exactly in this context where the rights and 
freedoms valued by our democratic society guarantees that human beings are treated 
with fairness and dignity. However in order to protect these same freedoms, rights and 
values from the horrors of organised crime, our courts have not hesitated to use the 
interpretative processes to protect the interests of our democratic society.  It is an 
approach that is both flexible and takes cognizance of the socio-economic realities within 
which the structures of organized crime operates. The approach is a practical one and 
not an approach which makes use of metaphors and the likes to make value judgments 
regarding the interpretation of POCA. Although the above views are insightful regarding 
the type of approaches that may be applied in interpretation of POCA, I submit their real 
value is indicating the substantive reasoning as opposed to formalism with which 
interpretation should be approached. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
 
Grasping the distinction between the direct and indirect application of the Bill of Rights is 
cardinal to the interpretative process of legislation. It is not only important for determining 
and adhering to the values as enshrined in Section 1 of the Constitution, but vital in 
fostering a developing constitutional culture, the Constitution requires the spheres to 
create. This distinction is also inseparable from the value-laden approach towards 
interpretation, mandated by the Constitution itself. It is within the context of this 
constitutional culture and constitutional values underpinning our system of justice that 
legislation, such as POCA, should be understood. The introduction of similar legislative 
measures highlights the importance of the distinction of direct and indirect application 
and the interpretative means that should be adopted to utilize these measures to the 
protection of these fundamental rights and freedoms as contained within the Bill of 
Rights. It is exactly this distinction and value-laden approach containing this distinction 
which the Court in Savoi ignored and which is fundamental to the Constitutional Court 
consideration to confirm the order of invalidity. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 
                                PRACTICAL ORGANISED CRIME 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
To fully understand POCA jurisprudence, I submit that a practical analysis of POCA 
legislation to specific circumstances will be required. In this Chapter the practical 
application of POCA as opposed to ordinary criminal law will be demonstrated, by 
examining two distinct set of facts.  The objective of these practical exercises is to 
demonstrate how POCA seeks to protect and preserve the fundamental freedoms and 
rights as contained in the Bill of Rights from the phenomenon of organized crime. 
Further illustrating that the reasoning in the Savoi Judgment fails to take into account 
these practicalities as part of the value-laden approach to interpretation which should 
have been adopted. 
 
4.2 First Example68 
 
Police stop 3 occupants during a routine roadblock in Khayalitsha: Ano, Bono, and 
Combo. All of them are members of the Phillistinians Criminal Gang, who operates in the 
suburbs of Cape Town with their stronghold in Khayalitsha. They have a tattoo mark 
“PG” which stands for Phillistinian Gang. Their leader is Nongoloza, a well known 
business man in Khayalitsha. The gang has about 50 members involved in hijacking, 
robberies, murders, Cash in Transit robberies, Rival Gang fights, etc. They report 
directly to him and receive instructions from him. Nothing happens without his approval. 
1) They searched the car and found firearms and tools that they suspected were used in 
breaking into cars and a bunch of various car keys. R30 000 cash was also found in the 
car. 
2) They arrested the 3 suspects and during the interrogation, ANO confessed to the 
police that they are a group in the business of hijacking and stealing cars. He gave the 
                                                 
68 These practical examples are contained in “The Organised Crime Component POCA Training Materials, 
28th -30th March 2012” and used with permission of  the author ,Mr.Livingstone Sakatha, Deputy Director 
of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape. 
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details of 6 cars they had hijacked all around the Cape Peninsula area and 7 cars that 
they had also stolen. He further indicated that all those cars had been sold to a 
gentleman known as KALLIE, in Bellville. He also confessed to robberies; cash in transit 
robberies and murders committed by them and other gang members. 
3) He took the police to Bellville South and there he pointed out KALLIE to the police. 
KALLIE was arrested. Police found out that KALLIE is a partner in a car sales business 
known as OASIS MOTOR DEALERS. Other partners are PIETER, KOOS and JOE. 
4) The police confiscated all the books of the motor dealers business. An employee at 
the motor dealers told the police that they have other cars at a workshop in Athlone 
which were being repaired by MR. FIXIT. 
5) There is R600 000, 00 in the bank account of the motor dealers at FNB. The personal 
Bank accounts of PIETER, KOOS and JOE amounted to R350 000, 00 for each. 
6) MR FIXIT showed the police 2 cars which were brought to him by JOE for respraying. 
The personal assets of MR.FIXIT are valued at R2, 5 million. 
7) When the police searched the workshop they found implements which appear to be 
used for changing engine numbers and the details of the cars. 
8) MR.FIXIT also informed the police that after respraying   or changing the details of the 
cars brought to him, he took the cars to Stikland registration centre where a police officer 
known to him as SKELM and cashier (female) by the name of LYDIA helped him to clear 
the cars for registration. 
9) The police further investigated the whereabouts of the 13 cars mentioned by ANO. 
10) They found the dockets for the cars stolen and hijacked. 
 
4.3 Second Example 
 
A truck full   of sheep and lamb carcasses from the Enterprise Meat Company was being 
driven by the driver and his assistant from Malmesbury to Cape Town Abattoir. 
1) The two accused A and B, were hitchhiking on the N7 road to Cape Town. The driver 
stopped to give them a lift. The two accused boarded, but 10km from Cape Town, the 
accused produced firearms and directed the driver to drive to a secluded area where the 
accused shot both the driver and his assistant. 
2) They then drove the vehicle to Brian who has a warehouse in Landsdowne. They 
agreed with Brian that he would store the cargo, while they went to search for buyers. 
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3) Brian then phoned 4 Butcheries owners and offered them the carcasses at R150, 00 
each. There were 500 carcasses in the truck. The value of the carcasses was R900, 00 
each. 
4) The accused then took the truck to Mr. Huys who owns a Second Hand Spare parts 
shop. He buys the truck for R20 000, 00 and immediately asks his employees to strip 
and dismantle the truck for all its parts. 
5) A, bought a car with his share of the money. He had a fight with his girlfriend after 
drinking alcohol and assaulted her badly. He was arrested for the assault and the 
girlfriend in her anger also told the police about the hijacking and the murder. 
  
4.4. Application of Organized Crime Principles 
 
The two examples will   be analyzed, in depth and I will illustrate how POCA applies, 
with reference to identifying the possible accused, charges, asset forfeiture possibilities 
and the elements of Chapters of POCA. The objective of the entire exercise is to place, 
the reader in a better position of understanding the functioning and application of POCA, 
as well as the jurisprudence that will be discussed. 
 
The analysis will consist of firstly identifying the accused, secondly identifying the 
possible primary/ordinary charges in terms of the ordinary principles of criminal law and 
then POCA charges; lastly possible asset forfeiture procedures with reference to assets 
will be identified .Primary offences will be identified to illustrate the inadequacy of 
ordinary criminal principles in holding liable persons involved in organized crime, whilst 
the application of POCA will illustrate the latter’s effectiveness. 
 
4.4.1. First Example Examined 
 
4.4.1.1 Ano, Bono, Combo, the Phillistinian Gang, Nongoloza and Kallie 
To the point where Ano confesses to the police, the possible accused are Ano, Bono, 
Combo, the Phillistinian Gang and its 50 members, Nongoloza and Kallie . 
 
4.4.1.1.1 Ordinary Charges 
1. Possession of unlicensed firearms against Ano, Bono and Combo 
2. Possession of Housebreaking implements against Ano, Bono and Combo 
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3. Possession of stolen property of the R30 000 against Ano, Bono and Combo 
4. Six charges of Robbery with aggravating circumstances against Ano, Bono and 
Combo 
5. Seven charges of theft against Ano, Bono and Combo 
6. Thirteen charges of theft against Kallie 
7. Depending on the information Ano provides several charges of hijacking, robbery, 
murder against the various members of the Phillistinian Gang. 
 
4.4.1.1.2 POCA Charges 
1.Section 9(1)(a)69(Gang participation) against Ano, Bono ,Combo, Nongoloza and each 
member of the Phillistinian Gang, . 
2. Section 9(2) (b) 70 against Nongoloza, as the leader of the Phillistinian Gang 
3.Section 4(a) 71(Money laundering) against Ano, Bono and Combo, in the sense that 
they deliver cars to Kallie, who buys the stolen cars, having the effect of concealing true 
ownership of the cars. 
4.Section 4(a) 72 against Kallie for the same reason as stated above 
5. Section 2(f) 73(Racketeering) against Nongoloza as the manager of the enterprise of 
selling stolen cars to Kallie 
6. Section 2(e) 74 against Ano, Bono and Combo as employees of Nongoloza providing 
the cars to Kallie 
7.Section 2(a)75 against Kallie for buying the stolen cars and using them in the daily 
operations of OASIS MOTOR DEALERS. 
 
4.4.1.1.3 Asset Forfeiture 
The possible forfeiture exists in respect of the R30 000 found in the car. The state can 
apply in terms of Chapter 676, firstly in terms of Section 3877, for a preservation order. 
The High Court must grant a preservation order if the state proves any of the grounds in 
                                                 
69 Section 9(1)(a) of POCA  
70 Section 9(2)(b) of POCA  
71 Section 4(a)(i) of POCA 
72 Section 4(a)(i) of POCA 
73 Section 2(f) of POCA 
74 Section 2(e) of POCA  
75 Section 2(a) of POCA  
76 Chapter 6 of POCA 
77 Section 38(1) of POCA 
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Section 38(2)78. However the preservation order will expire in 90 days unless the State 
applies for a forfeiture order79. For a final forfeiture to the state, the state will have to 
apply in terms of section 48 80 for a forfeiture order .The High Court shall make an order 
applied for in terms of Section 4881,by the state, if the state proves any of the 
circumstances in Section 5082. In this set of facts, the state would be successful in the 
arguement that the monies seized are proceeds of crime, which would be grounds for an 
order in terms Section 38(2)83 and an order in terms of Section 5084. 
 
4.4.1.2 Oasis Motor Dealers, Pieter, Koos, Joe  
 
4.4.1.2.1 Ordinary Charges 
Thirteen charges of Theft against Oasis Motor Dealers, Pieter, Koos, Joe. 
 
4.4.1.2.2 POCA Charges 
One charge of contravention of Section 4(b)85  against Oasis Motor dealers, Pieter, 
Koos, Joe in the sense they ought reasonably to have known that Kallie,  buys the stolen 
cars, having the effect of concealing true ownership of the car and as such they acted in 
concert with Kallie .  
 
4.4.1.2.3 Asset Forfeiture: 
1. The state may apply for a restraint order in terms of Section 2686  against the amounts 
of R600 000,00  of the Motor Dealership at FNB and  the personal Bank accounts of 
Pieter, Koos and Joe amounted to R350 000,00 for each. The state will have to satisfy 
the High Court to exercise its discretion in terms of Section 2687  circumstances under 
Section 2588 exists. In this scenario, the best argument would be Section25 (b)89 in the 
sense that a charge will be leveled against the abovementioned accused and a 
                                                 
78 Section 38(2)(a),(b),(c) of POCA 
79 Section 40(a) of POCA 
80 Section 48(1) of POCA  
81 Section 48(1) of POCA 
82 Section 50(1)(a) or (b) or (c) of POCA  
83 Section 48(1) of POCA 
84 Section 50(1)(b) of POCA  
85 Section 4(b)(i) of POCA 
86 Section 26(1) of POCA 
87 Section 26(1) of POCA 
88 Section 25 (1)(a)(i),(ii) or (b)(i),(ii) of POCA 
89 Section 25(b) of POCA 
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confiscation order will be granted against them. This order prevents the accused from 
using their benefits from crime, before the state can apply that such gains be forfeited to 
the state. The accused is then prevented from dealing with such property in any 
manner90.  
2. If the restraint order is granted, the logical next step would be to apply for a 
confiscation order in terms of Section 1891 . This order may be granted by a court after 
the accused conviction, forfeiting the amounts to the state as the proceeds of crime. This 
order is usually granted to deter accused who may seemingly benefit from money 
laundering.    
3. Arguably, the state may apply that the workshop of Oasis Motor Dealers as well as 
the Motor Dealership be forfeited to the state as an instrumentality of crime, based on 
the conduct of Mr.Fixit and the instruments used at the workshop and Kallies sale of 
stolen vehicles. The state can apply in terms of Chapter 692, firstly in terms of Section 
3893, for a preservation order. The High Court must grant a preservation order if the state 
proves any of the grounds in Section 38(2)94. However the preservation order will expire 
in 90 days unless the State applies for a forfeiture order95. For a final forfeiture to the 
state, the state will have to apply in terms of section 48 96 for a forfeiture order .The High 
Court shall make an order applied for in terms of Section 4897, by the state, if the state 
proves any of the circumstances in Section 5098. In these circumstances Oasis Motor 
Dealers and the Motor Dealership could be argued to be instrumentalities of crime as 
required by Section 5099 
 
 
4.4.1.3 Mr.Fixit, Lydia and Skelm 
 
4.4.1.3.1 Ordinary Charges 
 Two charges of Fraud alternatively theft against Mr.Fixit, Lydia and Skelm 
                                                 
90 Section 26(1) of POCA 
91 Section 18(1) of POCA 
92 Chapter 6 of POCA 
93 Section 38(1) of POCA 
94 Section 38(2)(a),(b),(c) of POCA 
95 Section 40(a) of POCA 
96 Section 48(1) of POCA  
97 Section 48(1) of POCA 
98 Section 50(1)(a) or (b) or (c) of POCA 
99 Section 50(1)(a) of POCA 
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4.4.1.3.2 POCA Charges 
Section 4(b)100  against Mr.Fixit, Lydia and Skelm in the sense that they respray and 
change the details of the cars, having the effect of disguising true ownership of the cars 
 
4.4.1.2.3 Asset Forfeiture: 
The personal assets of MR.FIXIT are valued at R2, 5 million, could be forfeited in terms 
of Section 26101 and Section 18102 to the state. Firstly ,the state could apply for a restraint 
order in respect of these assets in terms of section 26(1), specifically in terms of 
Section26(2)103 for all the accused realizable property, specified in the restraint order or 
not. The State could then argue, after accused conviction that these assets are benefits 
derived from criminal activity related to the offences and should be forfeited to the state, 
as property to be realized, in order to make payment to the state for an amount 
determined by the court104. 
 
4.4.1.4 Kallie, Pieter, Koos, Joe ,Mr.Fixit, Lydia and Skelm  
4.4.1.4.1 POCA Charges 
Section 2(e)105  against Kallie, Pieter, Koos, Joe, Mr.Fixit, Lydia and Skelm in that knew 
or ought reasonable to have known that Oasis Motor Dealers was conducting the 
enterprise of selling stolen vehicles or changing the details of stolen vehicles and 
profiteering from it. 
 
4.4.2 Second Example examined 
 
4.4.2.1 A and B 
4.4.2.1.1 The ordinary charges 
1. Two charges of Possession of unlicensed firearms against A and B. 
2. One charge of Robbery of the truck against A and B 
                                                 
100 Section 4(b)(i) of POCA 
101 Section 26(1) of POCA 
102 Section 18 (1) (c) of POCA 
103 Section 26(2)(b) of POCA 
104 Section 18 (1) of POCA 
105 Section 2 (e) of POCA 
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3. Two charges of Murder against A and B 
4. Two charges of Kidnapping against A and B 
5. One charge of Assault Common against A. 
6. One charge of theft for the cargo of the truck against A and B. 
 
4.4.2.1.2 POCA charges 
1. One charge of contravention of Section 4(a)106 against A and B, in that both entered 
into an arrangement with Brian, to store the cargo ,whilst they searched for buyers, thus 
concealing the property. 
2. A second charge of contravention of Section 4(a)107  against A and B for selling the 
truck to Mr.Huys., conduct having the effect of concealing the true ownership of the 
truck. 
 
4.4.2.1.3 Asset Forfeiture 
1. R135000 confiscation order against A and B, collectively for the loss of the cargo and 
their benefit, in terms of Section26108 and Section18109 of POCA. R10 000 confiscation 
order against A and B each, individually for each share in the profit of the sale of the 
truck and lastly, A’s  car. The state’s best option would be to argue that a restraint order 
be granted in respect of all the accused realizable property, specified in the restraint 
order or not.110After conviction, the state can argue, that these assets be forfeited to the 
state in order to realize them for an amount determined by the court to be paid to the 
state.111 The argument that all these assets are benefits directly derived from their 
offences.112 
 
4.4.2.2 Brian 
 
4.4.2.2.1 The ordinary charges 
1. One charge of theft of the cargo 
2. Four charges of fraud for offering of the sale of the cargo to the 4 butcheries 
 
                                                 
106 Section 4 (a)(i) of POCA 
107Section 4(a)(i) of POCA 
108 Section 26 (1) of POCA 
109 Section 18 (1) of POCA 
110 Section 26(2)(b) of POCA 
111 Section 18 (1) of POCA 
112 Section 18(1)(a) of POCA 
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4.4.2.2.2 POCA charges 
1. One charge of contravention of Section 4(a) 113against Brian the arrangement with A 
and B, who store the cargo, while searching for buyers, assisting them to avoid 
prosecution. 
2. One charge of contravention of Section 6(c)114  against Brian for storing the cargo, 
possessing the proceeds of unlawful activities 
3. One charge of contravention of Section 5(b)115 for selling the proceeds of unlawful 
activities to make funds available. 
 
 4.4.2.2.3 Asset Forfeiture 
1. R135000 confiscation order against Brian, collectively with A and B for the loss of the 
cargo and benefit. The state could apply for an restraint order in terms of Section 
26(2)116, specifically for that benefit and argue that amount be paid to the State, in 
addition to punishment for Brian’s direct benefit from the crime.117 
 
4.4.2.3 Mr. Huys 
4.4.2.3.1 The ordinary charges 
 One charge of theft of the truck against Mr.Huys 
 
4.4.2.3.2 The POCA charges 
1. One charge of contravention of Section 4(a)118 against Mr.Huys, the arrangement with 
A and B, buying the truck assisting them to avoid prosecution. 
2. One charge of contravention of Section 6(a)119  against Mr.Huys, for acquiring the 
truck, when he ought to have reasonably known it is the proceeds of unlawful activities. 
 
 
4.4.2.3.3 Asset Forfeiture 
2. An order against Mr.Huys for the profit of the sale of the parts of the truck, in terms of 
Section26(2)120 and section18121. Firstly, the state could argue for a restraint order for all 
                                                 
113 Section 4(a)(ii)(aa) of POCA 
114 Section 6(c) of POCA 
115Section 5(b) of POCA  
116 Section 26(2)(a) of POCA 
117Section 18(1)(a) of POCA 
118Section 4(a)(ii) of POCA 
119Section 6(a) of POCA  
120Section 26(2) of POCA  
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realizable property.122 After conviction the state may argue that any or all property may 
be seized from the accused, with an order from court, to be realized for the satisfaction 
of an amount, specified by the court, in addition to any punishment123.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
I submit that the application of POCA as opposed to ordinary criminal law   practically 
demonstrates, the inadequacy of ordinary criminal principles in holding liable persons 
involved in organized crime. These exercises  simplifies the discussion of the indirect 
application of the Bill of Rights ; the jurisprudence of POCA and is exactly the central 
issue that the jurisprudence highlights. In the constitutional interpretative process of 
POCA, the bulk of the Supreme Courts decision emphasizes that the context of POCA is 
of importance, specifically spelled out by its Preamble. In the following chapters it 
becomes quite clear from the noteworthy cases that it is this very context that is the 
cornerstone of the constitutional interpretative process. It also the context which is taken 
into account when the Courts apply the value- laden approach in arriving at value 
judgments which  “promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.  
 
These practical examples also illustrate the objective and intended use of the POCA 
legislation. The practical use of POCA as a means to protect and preserve the 
constitutional rights and freedoms as listed in the Bill of Rights. These examples further 
strengthen the arguments that the Savoi-judgment is fundamentally flawed, because it 
fails to recognize the underlying values of  POCA. Values which would have an apparent 
to any jurist if the value-laden approach to the interpretative process was properly 
applied.  An approach, clearly lacking in the judgment to the detriment of any democratic 
society. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
121Section 18 of POCA  
122Section 26(2)(b) of POCA  
123 Section 18(1) of POCA 
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      CHAPTER 5  
 
                              SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE  
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I discuss certain judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal, in respect of 
POCA. The purpose of these discussions is to determine the type of substantive 
approach the superior courts have adopted to the interpretation of the POCA and the 
courts view of the specific legislation. Ultimately, these judgments reflect the indirect 
application of the Bill of Rights, the court observes when interpreting the POCA, as 
required by S39 (2)124. I will thoroughly discuss the indirect application of the Bill of 
Rights, with regards to the jurisprudence of the Superior Courts (both Supreme Court of 
Appeal and the Constitutional Court) in Chapter 6. The purpose of these discussions is 
to demonstrate how the Supreme Court has utilized the value laden approach to achieve 
the objective of POCA as outlined in its Preamble. 
 
5.2. Noteworthy judgments 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and others125, Farlam AJA, found 
that the distinction sought to be drawn between Chapter 6 and Chapter 5 could not be 
upheld126. In order to decide whether property was tainted by its link to criminal activity 
so that it was forfeited under an order made in terms of Chapter 6, entails an enquiry into 
the question whether the property was the proceeds of criminal activities, necessitating 
an inquiry into the past, viz as to whether the property had been derived, received or 
retained in connection with or as a result of any unlawful activity127. The use of the 
present tense in    S 38(2) and S50 (1) merely indicated that the property had to exist at 
the time the order was made. The fact that the Legislature had considered it necessary 
to state expressly in S 12(3)  and S19 (1) and in the definitions of 'pattern of criminal 
activity' and 'pattern of racketeering activity' that offences committed before the Act128 
came into operation could be looked at when dealing with matters falling under Chapters 
                                                 
124 39 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 
125 [2000] 1 All SA 302 (A) 
126 Carolus(n 125)316 
127 Carolus(n 125)316 
128 POCA 
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2, 4 and 5, was a strong indication that it had not intended that the provisions of Chapter 
6 should be applied retrospectively129. The cumulative effect of unfairness, the aversion 
of the legal culture to retrospectivity where it resulted in unfairness, the fact that the 
Legislature, had refrained from repeating the 'whether before or after the 
commencement of the Act' phrase used in S 12(3) and S19(1) of the Act130 and the fact 
that conduct before the commencement of the Act was specifically referred to in the 
definitions of 'pattern of criminal gang activity' and 'pattern of racketeering activity' 
;meant that on a proper interpretation of the Act131, Chapter 6 had not been intended to 
be retrospective132. 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Basson 133, Nugent AJA, similarly found 
that there was a strong presumption against the retrospective operation of a statute.134 
The fact that events preceding the coming into operation of the Act135 were to be taken 
into account in determining whether a defendant had 'benefited from unlawful   
activities’136 and in valuing the 'proceeds of unlawful activities’137 was not decisive of 
whether S 18(1) operated with the same effect.138 Those sections allowed for benefits 
received before the commission of the particular offence to be taken into account, both 
in determining whether a confiscation order should be made, and in determining the 
scope of such an order, and were equally consistent  with the section operating only 
prospectively as they were with it operating retrospectively. To the extent that the 
provisions were of assistance at all, they indicated that the Legislature was alive to the 
question of retrospectivity, and the absence of similar words in 18(1)   suggested that the 
omission was deliberate139. 
 
                                                 
129 Carolus(n125)316 
130 POCA 
131 POCA 
132Carolus(n 125)317  
1332002 (1) SA 419 (SCA) 
134 Basson(n 133) 426 
135 POCA 
136 Section 12(3)  POCA 
137 Section 19(1) of POCA  
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139Basson(n 133) 428  
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In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Rebuzzi 140, Nugent AJA, remarked that  
the primary object of a confiscation order is not to enrich the State but  to deprive the 
convicted person of ill-gotten gains.141 The purpose of such an order is to prevent the 
convicted person from profiting rather than to enrich the State and that the court's inquiry 
in terms of S 18(1) is directed towards establishing the extent of his benefit rather than 
towards establishing who might have suffered loss. In the case of so-called "victimless" 
crimes, such as drug-dealing and the like, there will be no person who could be said to 
have suffered a loss.142 That a confiscation order might not be necessary in order to 
deprive the convicted person of the proceeds of crime (i.e. where there is an identifiable 
victim who has suffered loss) is not a reason to withhold such an order143. The order 
serves the purpose of ensuring that, irrespective of whether claims are in due course 
established, the convicted person will not remain in possession of the proceeds.144 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Kyriacou145, Mlambo AJA, found that a 
court that convicts an offender is not restricted to making a confiscation order in relation 
only to the offences of which the offender has been convicted146. S 18(1) of the Act147 
authorizes a court to make a confiscation order once it has found that the offender has 
benefited either from the offence of which he has been convicted, or from any other 
offence of which he has been convicted at the same trial, or from any criminal activity 
which the court finds to be sufficiently related to those offences148. A finding that the 
offender has benefited in any of those respects constitutes the jurisdictional fact that is 
necessary for a court to exercise its discretion to make a confiscation order149. Whether 
the court exercises that discretion, and the extent to which it does so, will depend upon 
the extent to which the offender is found to have benefited from either the crime 
concerned, or from other offences of which he was convicted, or from  related                         
criminal activity. 150The fact that a court, in convicting an offender of the offence of 
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receiving stolen property knowing it to have been stolen, has made an order in terms of 
s 34(1) (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act151 that the property concerned be returned to 
the rightful owners thereof, has no bearing on the jurisdictional fact that is necessary for 
the court to exercise its discretion to make a confiscation order152. Having found that the 
offender received a benefit from the crimes of which he was convicted, the court has 
discretion to order the confiscation of benefits he received not only from that criminal 
activity but also from related criminal activity153. 
  
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v RO Cook Properties (PTY) Ltd; National 
Director of Public Prosecutions v 37 Gillespie Street Durban (PTY) Ltd and another;  
National Director of Public Prosecution v Seevnarayan 154 , Mpati DP and Cameron JA, 
found that the inter-related purposes of Chapter 6 of the Act155  include: (a) removing 
incentives for crime; (b) deterring persons from using or allowing their property to be 
used in crime; (c) eliminating or incapacitating some of the means by which crime may 
be committed; and (d) advancing the ends of justice by depriving those involved in crime 
of the property concerned. Objectives (b) and (d) embody a palpably penal aspect; but 
the statutory objectives transcend the merely penal. Therefore, the provisions must be 
restrictively interpreted156 .Chapter 6's primary focus is not on wrongdoers, but on 
property  used to commit an offence or which constitutes the proceeds of crime. A 
criminal conviction is not a condition precedent to forfeiture, and property may be 
forfeited even where no charge is pending. In consequence (at least in the first phase of 
the chapter's two-stage procedure), the guilt or wrongdoing of owners or possessors of 
property is not primarily relevant to the proceedings. This approach to Chapter 6 has the 
interpretative consequence that in giving meaning to 'instrumentality of an offence' the 
focus is not on the state of mind of the owner, but on the role the property plays in the 
commission of   the crime. The phrase must be interpreted independently of the guilt or 
innocence of the property-owner. Where a forfeiture order is sought the Court thus 
undertakes a two-stage enquiry. The contextual and constitutional indicators pointing to 
a restrictive interpretation of 'instrumentality' make it unnecessary to intrude the owner's 
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culpability into the first stage157. The Act158 defines 'interest' very widely as including 'any 
right'. There can be no reason to exclude ownership - the most encompassing right of 
property - from that definition, nor to prevent owners from applying to exempt their full 
interest from forfeiture 159.The Act160 requires property owners to exercise responsibility 
for their property and to account for their stewardship of it in relation to its   possible 
criminal utilization. The pursuit of those statutory objectives cannot exceed what is 
constitutionally permissible. Forfeitures that do not rationally advance the inter-related 
purposes of Chapter 6 are unconstitutional. Deprivations going beyond those that 
remove incentives, deter the use of property in crime, eliminate or incapacitate the 
means by which crime may be committed and at the same time advance the ends of 
justice are not contemplated by or permitted under the Act161. The relationship between 
the purpose of the forfeiture and the property to be forfeited must be close, the purpose 
of the forfeiture must be compelling and a proportionality analysis - in which the nature 
and value of the property subject to forfeiture is assessed in relation to the crime 
involved and the role it played in its commission - may be appropriate at the final 
stage.162 The words 'concerned in the commission of an offence', used in the definition 
of 'instrumentality of an offence' in S1163, must be interpreted so that the link between 
the crime committed and the property is reasonably direct, and that the employment of 
the property must be functional to the commission of the crime. By this is meant that the 
property must play a reasonably direct role in the commission of the offence. In a real or 
substantial sense the property must   facilitate or make possible the commission of the 
offence. As the term 'instrumentality' itself suggests, the property must be instrumental 
in, and not merely incidental to, the commission of the offence. Otherwise there is no 
rational connection between the deprivation of property and the objective of the Act.164 
The deprivation will constitute   merely an additional penalty in relation to the crime, but 
without the constitutional safeguards that are a prerequisite for the imposition of criminal 
penalties. To qualify for forfeiture as an 'instrumentality of an offence' the property must 
play a part, in a reasonably direct sense, in those acts which constitute the actual 
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commission of the offence in question. It is not necessary that the property is the means 
by which the offence is committed. A relation of   indispensable causality between 
property and offence does not, by itself, constitute the measure of involvement 
necessary for making property an 'instrumentality' of the offence165. The fact that a crime 
is committed at a certain location does not by itself entail that the venue is 'concerned in 
the commission' of the offence. Either in its nature or through the manner of its 
utilization, the property must have been employed in some way to make possible or to 
facilitate the commission of the offence166 .The Act167 is designed to reach far beyond 
'organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities' and it clearly applies to 
cases of individual wrongdoing 168.The amplitude of the definition of 'proceeds of 
unlawful activities' ,should be approached somewhat differently from that in the case of 
'instrumentality of an offence'. This is because the risk of unconstitutional application is 
smaller. It is less likely that forfeiture of benefits derived, received or retained 'in 
connection with or as a result of any unlawful activity' would fail rationally to advance the 
Act's169 objectives of removing incentives, deterring the use of property in crime, 
eliminating or incapacitating the   means by which crime may be committed and at the 
same time advancing the ends of justice. The definition, subject to necessary attenuation 
of the linguistic scope of 'in connection with', should be given its full ambit.170 
 
In Prophet v National Director of Public Prosecutions171, Mpati DP, found   that a 
constitutional application of chapter 6 of POCA required an element of proportionality 
between the crime committed and the property to be forfeited. A balance must be struck 
between the public interest in effective crime fighting and the interests of private property 
owners affected by forfeiture laws172. The introduction of the forfeiture procedures by the 
POCA was brought about because of the realization, by the Legislature, that there was 
rapid growth, both nationally and internationally, of organized criminal activity and the 
desire to combat these criminal activities by, inter alia, depriving those who use property 
for the commission of an offence of such property. Forfeiture may play an important role 
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in the prevention and punishment of drug offences. Courts should thus guard against the 
danger of frustrating the lawmaker’s purpose for introducing the forfeiture procedure in 
the POCA. A mere sense of disproportionality should not lead to a refusal of the order 
sought. To ensure that the purpose of the law is not undermined, a standard of 
‘significant disproportionality’ ought to be applied for a court to hold that a deprivation of 
property is ‘arbitrary’ and thus unconstitutional, and consequently refuse to grant a 
forfeiture order. The owner should place the necessary material for a proportionality 
analysis before the court.173 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions v Vermaak174, Nugent AJA, decided that 
where an offence has been committed in the course of a broader enterprise of criminal 
activity, that is being conducted by the offender in association with others, deprivation 
can serve not only to inhibit the particular offender from continuing that activity but also 
to arrest the continuance of that activity by others who are party to the ongoing 
enterprise. Even where the offence is committed in the course of an ongoing criminal 
enterprise that is being conducted by the offender alone, the withdrawal of property is 
capable of having a severely inhibiting effect on its continuance. Forfeiture will have a 
great remedial effect where crime has become a business. Conversely, where the 
offence is not committed in the course of ongoing criminal activity, the ordinary criminal 
remedies are quite capable of serving the purpose of deterring the commission of further 
offences, whether by the particular offender or by other offenders. 175 
 
In  Mazibuko v The National Director of Public Prosecutions176 , Bosielo AJA   generally 
acknowledged that the effects of forfeiture are draconian and potentially invasive of the 
rights of people to their properties. There is an ever-present threat of a serious conflict 
between the right to property as provided for in S 25(1)177  and an order for the forfeiture 
of property under S 50(1) of the Act178. It is trite that the right to property is a 
fundamental right deeply ensconced in the Bill of Rights179. S 25(1) of the Constitution180 
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prohibits, in clear terms, any arbitrary deprivation of property. On the other hand S 7(2) 
of the Constitution obliges the State to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in 
the Bill of Rights. In addition S 39(1) of the Constitution requires our courts, when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, to promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. This places a duty on 
every court which has to consider possible forfeiture of property to be careful not to 
make orders which may exceed the proper and legitimate objectives striven for by the 
POCA. A failure to do so may result in orders which may be unduly invasive of the rights 
of innocent owners and which may amount to an abuse which is not constitutionally 
defensible181. The primary purpose of POCA is to prevent organized crime. In cases 
where property is used as an instrumentality of an offence, this can be achieved by 
having such property declared forfeit to the State. The intention underpinning such 
forfeiture is not necessarily to punish offenders, but to deprive them of the instrument 
used to facilitate or commit the offence. Such forfeiture is intended mainly to cripple the 
illegal activities which are carried on. Once this has happened, the objects of POCA will 
have been achieved.182 
 
In  National Director of Public Prosecutions v Gardener183 , Cachalia JA, found that 
 in the exercise of its discretion, a court must bear in mind the main object of the 
legislation, which is to strip sophisticated criminals of the proceeds of their criminal 
conduct. The legislature has, in Chapter 5 of POCA, provided an elaborate scheme to 
facilitate such stripping. The function of a court in this scheme is to determine the 
‘benefit’ from the offence, its value in monetary terms and the amount to be confiscated. 
It is undoubtedly so that a confiscation order may often have harsh consequences, not 
only for the defendant but also for others who may have innocently benefited, directly or 
indirectly, from the criminal proceeds. This is what the legislation contemplates and a 
court may not, under the guise of the exercise of its discretion, disregard its 
provisions.184 Confiscation and sentence are to be treated separately. The purpose of 
sentencing is to punish an offender for his or her criminal wrongdoing. The severity of a 
sentence is primarily intended to reflect the defendant’s culpability in relation to the 
offence for which he or she is being punished. The main purpose of a confiscation order 
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is to deprive offenders from deriving any benefit from their ill-gotten gains. The 
achievement of this purpose may have a punitive effect but this is not its rationale. The 
severity of a sentence, therefore, generally ought not to have a bearing on the exercise 
of a court’s discretion whether to make a confiscation order185. 
 
In De Vries v The State186,Leach JA, found the POCA was largely modeled upon 
“RICO”187 statute  from which the definitions of “pattern of racketeering activity” and 
“enterprise” were directly taken. The jurisprudence of the United States is of 
considerable assistance in understanding why indictments are usually formulated in this 
way. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides that no 
person shall be “subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life and limb”. 
This has given rise to the so-called defense of “double jeopardy”, a multi-facetted 
defense which, first, protects a citizen against a second prosecution for the same events 
after an acquittal on the first charge (autrefois acquit); secondly, bars a convicted 
offender being prosecuted once again for the same offence (autrefois convict) and, 
thirdly, protects against multiple punishments being imposed for the same offence 
(splitting of charges). After the introduction of RICO and other similar statutes188 
intended to combat organized crime, which introduced racketeering offences similar to 
those created by s 2 of POCA, many accused offenders in the United States raised 
pleas of double jeopardy in circumstances similar to the present. In doing so they argued 
that the RICO charge (sometimes referred to as an „umbrella‟ charge) together with the 
underlying so-called „predicate offences‟ relied on to prove the racketeering activities, 
led them to face either being convicted again for earlier offences in respect of which they 
had already been tried, or to being sentenced twice for the same unlawful action. The 
arguments in respect of those pleas were essentially the same as that upon which the 
present appellant relies, namely, that having been convicted in respect of the predicate 
offences it is impermissible to either convict or sentence him for the umbrella offence of 
racketeering. These arguments received short shrift in the United States. In a series of 
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decisions the courts189 of that country held the umbrella offences to be separate and 
discrete from the underlying predicate offences – and capable of being punished 
separately190. The definition of pattern of racketeering activity, which the state is obliged 
to prove in order to secure a conviction under s 2(1)(e) of the POCA, includes offences 
for which the offender may already have been convicted and sentenced ─ the 
legislature’s necessary intent in this regard is to be inferred from the phrase “excluding 
any period of imprisonment” in the calculation of the 10 year period referred to in the 
definition of “pattern of racketeering activity”. In addition, the preamble to the POCA also 
proclaims  its intent 191.Due to the similarities between RICO and POCA, and bearing in 
mind certain of the decisions in the United States, the Court in S v Dos Santos and 
another192 concluded:.. “Prosecutions under POCA, as also the predicate offences, 
would usually involve considerable overlap in the evidence, especially where the 
enterprise exists as a consequence of persons associating and committing acts making 
up a pattern of racketeering activity. Such overlap does not in and of itself occasions an 
automatic invocation of an improper splitting of charges or duplication of convictions. As 
should be evident from a simple reading of the statute, a POCA conviction requires proof 
of a fact which a conviction in terms of the Diamonds Act193 does not. I can conceive of 
no reason in principle or logic why our approach should be any different to that adopted 
by our American counterparts “ 
 
Proving an offense in terms of S 2(1)(e) of POCA, the State must do more than merely 
prove the underlying predicate offences. It must also demonstrate the accused 
association with an enterprise and a participatory link between the accused and that 
enterprise’s affairs by way of a pattern of racketeering activity. In the light of this, an 
offence under S 2(1) of POCA is clearly separate and discrete from its underlying 
predicate offences. POCA recognizes that past convictions may be taken into account in 
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establishing a pattern of racketeering, there is no reason in either law or logic why that 
pattern cannot be established by proving both the umbrella and predicate offences in the 
same trial.194  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
The judgments of Basson and Carolus are illustrative of the extremes of the generous 
approach, where the interpretative methodology utilized by the Court to the advantage of 
the accused. The accused are given the full benefit of their constitutional rights as 
enshrined in Section 35 of the Constitution. These two judgments are disappointing, 
especially in light of the context and purpose of POCA. I submit that in applying the 
value-laden approach, the value judgment that should have been made would have 
taken cognizance of the language, context, history, purpose, text of POCA. The interests 
of both the individual and that of the state should have been taken into account in 
advancing the protection of the democratic state. Fortunately, the other judgments of 
reflect how the SCA, indeed developed a jurisprudence entailing the value-laden 
approach. Rebuzzi ,Kyriacou and Gardener are indicative of the value-laden approach, 
where the SCA emphasized the language, text and purpose of POCA in making 
judgments advancing the democratic goals of POCA. Cook Properties, Prophet ; and 
Mazibuko   are judgments where the SCA focuses on both the historical ,language and 
text of POCA itself, while developing the notion of proportionality . I submit that this is 
indicative of the SCA developing the constitutional value of fairness, a notion that the 
Constitutional Court has indicated several times forms part of our criminal justice 
system.195De Vries exemplifies the cognizance the SCA takes of foreign law in the 
application of POCA. This accord with the versatile and value-laden approach that is 
required in promotion and development of constitutional values. I submit that the overall 
jurisprudence of the SCA reflects and supports the approach of Devenish and is 
exemplary of the inductive and substantive reasoning required by section 39 of the 
Constitution. The jurisprudence of the SCA is indicative of a value-laden approach 
seeking to achieve and enhance the objectives of POCA, outlined in its preamble. It 
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further strengthens the notion that the Savoi-judgment is fundamentally flawed, because 
it fails to recognize this jurisprudence encompassing the value-laden interpretative 
approach to POCA.   
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   CHAPTER 6  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JURISPRUDENCE  
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I discuss certain judgments of the Constitutional Court, in respect of 
POCA. The purpose of these discussions is to determine the type of substantive 
approach the superior courts have adopted to the interpretation of POCA and the courts 
view of the specific legislation. Ultimately, these judgments reflect the indirect application 
of the Bill of Rights, the court observes when interpreting POCA, as required by S39 
(2)196. I will thoroughly discuss the indirect application of the Bill of Rights, with regards 
to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court  As with the previous chapter ,the 
purpose of these discussions is to demonstrate how the Constitutional Court has utilized 
the value laden approach to achieve the objective of POCA as outlined in its Preamble. 
Ultimately these demonstrations will illustrate how flawed the reasoning of the Savoi-
judgment is for failure to employ the value-laden approach, from a comparative 
viewpoint. 
 
 
6.2.Noteworthy judgments 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others197 
,Ackerman J, found “ the Act’s198 overall purpose can be gathered from its long title and 
preamble and summarized as follows: The rapid growth of organized crime, money 
laundering, criminal gang activities and racketeering threatens the rights of all in the 
Republic, presents a danger to public order, safety and stability, and threatens economic 
stability. This is also a serious international problem and has been identified as an 
international security threat. South African common and statutory law fail to deal 
adequately with this problem, because of its rapid escalation and because it is often 
impossible to bring the leaders of organized crime to book, in view of the fact that they 
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invariably ensure that they are far removed from the overt criminal activity involved. The 
law has also failed to keep pace with international measures aimed at dealing effectively 
with organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities. Hence, the need 
for the measures embodied in the Act199.It is common cause that conventional criminal 
penalties are inadequate as measures of deterrence when organized crime leaders are 
able to retain the considerable gains derived from organized crime, even on those 
occasions when they are brought to justice. The above problems make a severe impact 
on the young South African democracy, where resources are strained to meet urgent 
and extensive human needs. Various international instruments deal with the problem of 
international crime in this regard and it is now widely accepted in the international 
community that criminals should be stripped of the proceeds of their crimes, the purpose 
being to remove the incentive for crime, not to punish them. This approach has similarly 
been adopted by our legislature. The present Act200 represents law reform which has 
sought to give effect to South Africa’s international obligation to ensure that criminals do 
not benefit from their crimes…(My emphasis)”201. Further “The order, in this matter was 
couched as a notional severance order. It followed from the High Court’s construction of 
section 38202, and its consequent finding that the section was regarded as inconsistent 
with section 34 of the Constitution because it precluded an application under section 38 
being made on notice, and further precluded the High Court hearing the matter from 
granting a rule nisi and ordering such rule nisi to act as an interim property preservation 
and seizure order under the section. The defect in the section which the High Court 
sought to remedy was accordingly an omission from the section, namely the failure to 
provide for the above procedure and remedy. The High Court attempted to do something 
that the Constitutional Court had held could not be done, that is, to remedy, by notional 
severance formulation, a constitutional invalidity caused by an omission (My 
emphasis)203. The Court then referred to an earlier constitutional judgment. 
“Where the invalidity of a statutory provision resulted from an omission, it was not 
possible to achieve notional severance by using words such as “invalid to the extent 
that”, or other expressions indicating notional severance. An omission could not, 
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notionally, be cured by severance. The only logical equivalent to severance, in the case 
of invalidity caused by omission, was the device of reading in.204 
 
In National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another v Mohamed NO and Others205 
Ackerman J, found that  
“It is common cause, and correctly so, that on the High Court’s construction of the 
section, the constitutional fair hearing rights of various persons could be materially 
limited and that unless such limitation was justifiable under section 36 of the 
Constitution, section 38206 would be constitutionally invalid. On the construction favored 
by both parties in the present hearing, this would not be the case and the section would 
pass constitutional muster. A settled principle of constitutional construction recognizes 
that a statutory provision may be capable of more than one reasonable construction. If   
the one construction leads to constitutional invalidity but  the other not, the latter 
construction, being in conformity with the Constitution, must be preferred to the former, 
provided always that such construction is reasonable and not strained207…. The 
importance of the audi rule, as one of the main pillars of the section 34 fair hearing right 
needs to be stressed, when construing a statutory provision which, it is contended, 
excludes audi .208..It is well established that, as a matter of statutory construction, the 
audi rule should be enforced unless it is clear that the legislature has expressly or by 
necessary implication enacted that it should not apply or that there are exceptional 
circumstances which would justify a court not giving effect to it209. 
 
For stronger reasons this approach should apply when construing a statutory provision 
in order to determine its constitutionality. Accordingly, in construing section 38210 where 
no express reference is made to the audi principle, or its exclusion, the question to be 
asked is not whether the audi principle can be implied in the section, but rather whether 
it has been excluded from the section by clear necessary implication, or whether there 
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are exceptional circumstances which would justify a court not giving effect to it211…. We 
have adopted the view, consistently enunciated over the years by the courts, that words 
cannot be read into a statute by implication unless the implication is a necessary one in 
the sense that without it effect cannot be given to the statute as it stands and that such 
implication must be necessary in order to realize the ostensible legislative intention or to 
make the Act212 workable. The same approach must be adopted when considering 
whether, by necessary implication, the audi principle has been excluded from section 
38213 and it cannot be found that it has been so excluded. There are no exceptional 
circumstances and the purposes of the Act214 can be fully achieved when, in relation to 
section 38215, the principles relating to the issuing of rules nisi and the making of interim 
preservation orders are applied by a High Court. The essence of these principles is their 
practicability, flexibility and adaptability. They can be narrowly and appropriately tailored 
to accommodate the interests of the State in attaining the purposes of the Act216, in 
particular in preventing property to which the State can lay claim under the Act217 from 
disappearing or being squandered, and also to protect, as far as possible, the interests 
of the individuals by observing the audi rule and in so doing to afford them as fair a trial 
as possible under section 34218….The proper construction of section 38219 is that the 
audi rule has not been excluded and that the principles relating to the issuing of rules 
nisi and the making of interim preservation orders by the High Courts, as discussed in 
this judgment, are applicable to the section 38220 procedures when the National Director 
applies ex parte, as he is entitled to do in all cases, for relief under section 38221…”222 
 
In Fraser v Absa Bank Ltd223 the Court in deciding whether to grant leave to appeal the 
Court observed that Applicant had not challenged the constitutional validity of any of the 
provisions of the POCA itself, or of the restraint order. He merely claimed that the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of POCA was constitutionally problematic. 
Nevertheless the Court was satisfied that a constitutional matter was raised. The proper 
interpretation of section 26(6) of the POCA was in issue. That provision conferred a 
discretion to allow the payment of reasonable legal expenses for a criminal trial and 
related matters out of restrained property. The way in which the discretion was exercised 
would determine how much of the restrained property was available for legal fees in the 
criminal trial and could have an effect on how speedily the trial was conducted224. 
Applicant had invoked section 35(3)(d) (prohibits an unreasonable delay in trial 
proceedings) and section 35(3)(f)225. These two provisions were relevant. The question 
arose whether the Supreme Court of Appeal’s interpretation of section 26226 had failed to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights in terms of section 39(2)227. 
Section 39(2)228 required more from a court than merely to avoid an interpretation which 
conflicted with the Bill of Rights. It demanded the promotion of the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights. These were to be found in the matrix and totality of rights 
and values embodied in the Bill of Rights. It could also in appropriate cases be found in 
the protection of specific rights such as in casu the right to a fair trial in section 35(3)229 
of which the rights to legal representation and against unreasonable delays were 
components. The spirit, purport and objects of the protection of the right to a fair trial 
therefore had to be considered. A constitutional matter had thus been raised.230 The 
questions that arose were whether a concurrent creditor of a defendant had standing to 
intervene in an application by that defendant in terms of section 26(6)231 to provide in a 
restraint order for reasonable legal expenses; whether a court had a discretion to allow it 
to intervene; and if so, the nature and extent of the discretion. The Court set out its 
reasons for holding that on the wording of POCA, the High Court had discretion to allow 
a creditor to intervene. Such an interpretation was not at odds with the obligation to 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. Whether the intervention of a 
creditor could result in a situation where a criminal trial had to be unreasonably delayed 
was an important factor to be considered by the court when exercising its discretion. The 
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right to legal representation embodied in section 35(3)(f) of the Constitution did not mean 
that an accused was entitled to the legal services of any counsel he or she chose, 
regardless of his or her financial situation. An accused also had the right to have a legal 
practitioner assigned at the State’s expense in terms of section 35(3)(g)232 where 
substantial injustice would otherwise result. The extent to which this might be 
appropriate or sufficient in a particular case would depend on all the particular 
circumstances, including the complexity and seriousness of the criminal charges233. 
 
In Mohunram and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others234- 
A question arose as to whether the offences for which forfeiture was potentially 
competent were limited to those created by the POCA, namely racketeering ; money 
laundering  and criminal gang activities under. These could collectively be termed 
“organized crime offences” as distinct from “ordinary crimes.” The Court divided on this 
issue235. Van Heerden AJ held that “offence” in the context of civil forfeiture authorized 
by Chapter 6 of the POCA was not limited to “organized crime offences” as distinct from 
“ordinary crimes.” Specifically: 
 
“First, it is important to note that, subsequent to the judgment of the Cape High Court in 
National Director of Public Prosecutions v Carolus and Others,20  in which Blignault J 
held that Chapter 6 of POCA  (as it was then) was not retrospective in effect,  the Act 
was amended by the Prevention of Organised Crime Second Amendment Act 38 of 
1999,  (“Act 38 of 1999”) “so as to make it clear that the provisions of Chapters 3, 5 and 
6 are applicable in respect of instrumentalities of offences and proceeds of unlawful 
activities where such offences or unlawful activities occurred before the commencement 
of the Act”,  that is, that these provisions do operate retrospectively. The definition of 
“instrumentality of an offence” in section 1(1) of POCA was substituted so as to mean: 
“any property which is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an 
offence at any time before or after the commencement of this Act, whether 
committed within the Republic or elsewhere”. (Emphasis added.) 
The definition of “proceeds of unlawful activity” was also substituted to mean: 
“. . . any property or any service, advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, 
received or retained, directly or indirectly, in the Republic or elsewhere, at any time 
before or after the commencement of this Act, in connection with or as a result of 
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any unlawful activity carried on by any person, and includes any property 
representing property so derived.” 
 
The point of the amending legislation was driven home most pertinently by the insertion 
of a new section 1(5) into POCA in the following terms: 
“Nothing in this Act or in any other law, shall be construed so as to exclude the 
application of any provision of Chapter 5 or 6 on account of the fact that – 
(a) 
any offence or unlawful activity concerned occurred; or 
(b) 
any proceeds of unlawful activities were derived, received or retained, before 
the commencement of this Act.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
This being so, the contention of the LRP to the effect that the offences for which 
forfeiture under Chapter 6 of POCA is potentially competent are limited to the offences 
“created” by Chapters 2, 3 and 4 of POCA (what the LRP calls “organised crime 
offences”) cannot be correct. A reading of POCA, as amended, makes it clear that it 
applies to offences committed before and after the commencement of the Act and 
accordingly has a wider ambit than that of offences that were “created” by POCA, and 
which thus only existed from its date of commencement in January 1999.”236 
 
 Sachs J observed that no “bright lines” could be drawn between organized crime and 
private criminal activities. It was unnecessary to decide the issue. For the purposes of 
the judgment, they would assume that there was no obligatory jurisdictional requirement 
that the instrument of an offence be shown to have a connection with organized crime. It 
was assumed that once a criminal offence was literally covered by the schedule to the 
POCA, and the property concerned was proved to be an instrument in its commission, a 
forfeiture order in terms of Chapter 6237 became permissible.238 
Moseneke DCJ similarly found it unnecessary to decide the issue. The conclusion 
reached on proportionality rendered it unnecessary to resolve the issue in the instant 
case. Furthermore, the proper scope of section 50(1)239 had not been debated before 
the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, Moseneke DCJ observed that 
the proposition that “offence” in the context of civil forfeiture authorized by Chapter 6 of 
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the POCA was indeed limited to “organized crime offences” as distinct from “ordinary 
crimes” was not without merit.240 
 
In Shaik and Others v The State241 , the Court found that it will be useful to describe the 
scheme of criminal confiscation contemplated by POCA. Chapter 5 of POCA confers a 
power on a criminal court to make a confiscation order against a person who has been 
convicted of a crime where the court has found that the person has benefited from the 
crime. Once a person has been convicted, the prosecutor may apply for a confiscation 
order.  In order for a confiscation order to be made, the court must find that the person 
convicted of the offence has derived a benefit from the offence of which he or she has 
been convicted or of any “criminal activity which the court finds to be sufficiently related” 
to that offence. The court may then make an order that the person pay to the State “any 
amount it considers appropriate”. A confiscation order is a civil judgment for payment to 
the State of an amount of money determined by the court and is made by the court in 
addition to a criminal sentence. Before going further, it is important to emphasize that the 
order that a court may make in terms of chapter 5 is not for the confiscation of a specific 
object, but an order for the payment of an amount of money to the State, even though it 
is ordinarily referred to as a “confiscation order”. The mechanism of a civil judgment 
sounding in money may well have been selected by the Legislature to avoid the difficulty 
of tracing particular assets which may have been the proceeds of crime and so to 
facilitate the recovery of the value of the proceeds. Section 12(3) of the POCA provides 
that for the purposes of chapter 5242, “a person has benefited from unlawful activities if 
he or she has at any time, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, 
received or retained any proceeds of unlawful activities”. “Proceeds of unlawful activities” 
are in turn broadly defined in section 1 of POCA .The section is widely cast, something 
which becomes even more evident when the definition of “property” contained in section 
1 of the Act is considered. One of the reasons for the wide ambit of the definition of 
“proceeds of crime” is that sophisticated criminals will seek to avoid proceeds being 
confiscated by creating complex systems of “camouflage”. Similarly, the definition makes 
clear that proceeds of crime will constitute proceeds even if “indirectly obtained”.  A 
person who has benefited through the enrichment of a company as a result of a crime in 
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which that person has an interest will have indirectly benefited from that crime.  Finally, it 
should be noted that “proceeds”, as defined, include anything “derived, received or 
retained” in connection with or as a result of the offences. Section 18(2)243 sets two 
bases for calculating the upper limit of the amount that may be confiscated.  For the 
purposes of the judgment, only the amount ordered to be confiscated that may not have 
exceeded the value of the proceeds of the offences or related criminal activities as 
calculated in accordance with chapter 5 of the Act, was considered That calculation 
would, be based on the definition of the proceeds of unlawful activities as set out in 
POCA. Section 19(1) of the Act is also relevant in calculating the value. Chapter 5 deals 
with the making of confiscation orders by a criminal court at the end of a criminal trial. Its 
structure and process is therefore different to that contemplated by Chapter 6244. The 
Preamble to the Act captures the overall purposes of the POCA very clearly. The 
preamble which points most directly to the key purpose of Chapter 5245: to ensure that 
no person can benefit from his or her wrongdoing. From this primary purpose, two 
secondary purposes flow. The first is general deterrence: to ensure that people are 
deterred in general from joining the ranks of criminals by the realization that they will be 
prevented from enjoying the proceeds of the crimes they may commit. And the second is 
prevention: the scheme seeks to remove from the hands of criminals the financial 
wherewithal to commit further crimes. These purposes are entirely legitimate in our 
constitutional order246.Understanding the purposes of chapter 5 of the POCA are best 
done on the terms of Chapter 2 of our Constitution247 and our own legislation. Upon a 
proper construction of the POCA, Chapter 5’s248 primary purpose seems rather to be to 
ensure that criminals cannot enjoy the fruits of their crimes. It may well be that the 
achievement of this purpose might at times have a punitive effect, but that is not to say 
that the primary purpose is punitive.249 
 
In Naidoo and Others v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another250, 
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the Court found that “to interpret the wide discretion conferred by section 26(1)251 as 
permitting an override of the preconditions expressly set in section 26(6)252 would run 
counter to the scheme of the provisions as a whole. The provision for reasonable legal 
and living expenses in section 26(6)253 is narrowly and finely crafted. Its careful 
mechanism should not readily be overridden. And its overall legislative purpose must be 
borne in mind. It is to discourage defendants who face criminal prosecution from hiding 
their assets. If a defendant retains the alleged proceeds of crime, they remain available 
for living and legal expenses. But if these assets are donated away, they become 
unavailable for this purpose. This is a legitimate statutory objective and the Court’s 
construction of the provisions recognizes it.”254 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The value-laden interpretative approach is apparent throughout all the noteworthy 
judgments of the CC. In Mohammed 1, the Court takes several factors into account in 
arriving at the proper judgment, reflective of the value-laden approach. The court 
considered the purpose of the Act, the history of organized crime in our democratic state 
and the inadequacies of the ordinary criminal principles in combating it, our state’s 
international obligations and the context of combating organized crime remedial 
processes. The court took these considerations into account as well as the language of 
the text itself, in order to arrive at the important decision that findings regarding the 
constitutionality of important legislation such as POCA, cannot be lightly made. A 
practical approach is required to cater to the needs of our new and emerging state and 
this exactly the approach which is reflected in Mohammed 2 and Shaik. In both these 
matters the CC emphasized the purpose of the Act and how the practicalities of the 
legislation require a flexible and adaptable approach. The notion of fairness in the 
principle of audi alt partem must be adhered to255, but also the notions of deterrence and 
prevention , must be sought to be advanced256.  Adherence to fairness is supported by 
the judgment of Fraser v ABSA, where cognizance of the individual’s rights is taken into 
account, in advancing the purpose of the POCA, as well as support for the views of 
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Shaik by Naidoo, in that the overall purpose of POCA is deterrence. I submit that the CC 
judgments are further illustrative of the approach of Devenish and inductive and 
substantive reasoning required by Section 39 of the Constitution and the CC. I submit 
that the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, like the SCA,  is indicative of a value-
laden approach seeking to achieve and enhance the objectives of POCA, outlined in its 
preamble. Thus, as in the previous chapter, the idea  that the Savoi-judgment is 
fundamentally flawed, because it fails to recognize this jurisprudence encompassing the 
value-laden interpretative approach to POCA as illustrated in the SCA and Constitutional 
Court jurisprudence, is confirmed.    
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   CHAPTER 7 
 
                INTERNATIONAL POSITION AND ACADEMIC VIEWS 
 
7.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I discuss the international position regarding POCA, as well as the 
viewpoints held by certain academic writers with regard to POCA. The purpose of these 
discussions is to determine the type of view that is held by some academic writers and 
the international approach, to a phenomenon that has global impact. I submit that a 
better understanding of these aspects places POCA in context, especially with regard to 
considerations of international law and foreign law. Considerations which are mandated 
and vital in terms of Section 39 of the Constitution and South Africa’s constitutional 
obligations of the observance and application of international law ,in terms  of the 
Constitution.257These views are core to the idea of comparing our current interpretative 
approach to other and international jurisdictions. Ultimately I submit that the discussion 
to follow is illustrative of how the South African value-laden interpretative approach to 
organized crime is the value-laden approach other and international jurisdictions have to 
this phenomenon. I submit that this comparison will also indicate the flawed reasoning of 
the Savoi-judgment for failure to take the international viewpoints correctly into account 
 
7.2. International and Foreign Legal Positions 
 
7.2.1 United Nations 
 
The 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 
 (Palermo Convention) was signed by 124 member states, including South Africa on the 
15 December 2000. The purpose of the convention is to promote cooperation to prevent 
and combat transnational crime more effectively.258 1. It applies, to the 
prevention, investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with 
articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of the Convention; and serious crime as defined in article 2 of the 
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Convention; where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an organized 
criminal group259. 
 
I submit that the most important article of this convention, for purposes of the value –
laden approach to interpretation, is Article 5 of the Convention, which holds: 
“1. Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: 
 
(a) Either or both of the following as criminal offences distinct from 
those involving the attempt or completion of the criminal activity: 
 
(i) Agreeing with one or more other persons to commit a serious 
crime for a purpose relating directly or indirectly to the obtaining 
of a financial or other material benefit and, where required 
by domestic law, involving an act undertaken by one of the 
participants in furtherance of the agreement or involving an 
organized criminal group; 
(ii) Conduct by a person who, with knowledge of either the aim and 
general criminal activity of an organized criminal group or its 
intention to commit the crimes in question, takes an active part 
in: 
a. Criminal activities of the organized criminal group; 
b. Other activities of the organized criminal group in the 
knowledge that his or her participation will contribute to the 
achievement of the above-described criminal aim;  “ 
 
In terms of Section 231 of the Constitution, South Africa is bound to its international 
agreements and must comply with its obligations and undertakings, in terms of 
international measures and agreements, it has adopted260. At the time of ratifying the 
Palermo Convention, POCA legislation had already been in effect and by adopting the 
Convention, South Africa was expanding its commitment to combat organised crime to a 
transnational or international level. I submit that Article 5(1)(ii)(a)and(b) is especially 
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important, i.e. that it criminalizes conduct of an offender. At an international level, 
cognizance is taken that an offender’s conduct is already an indication that a person with 
merely knowledge of the aim of an organized criminal group, participating in other 
activities of the group, can be held criminally accountable for the larger crimes. I submit 
that this article places into perspective the international context of the words “ought 
reasonably to have known.” as defined in Section 1 of POCA, referring not to an 
innocent party, but an active participant, although not fully aware of the grand design or 
even each activity of the organised criminal group, but aware of its general aim or 
criminal activity. The provisions of the Palermo Convention cannot be ignored if one 
takes into account the constitutional obligation of Section 233261 which provides: “When 
interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that 
is inconsistent with international law.” 
 
7.2.2 SADC – Countries 
 
The 14 member states of the Sothern African Development Countries are Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe262. 
 
To date, with the exception of Botswana and Zambia, all the members of the SADC 
countries have signed the Palermo Convention. However, it seems that adherence to the 
Convention, in the sense of introducing its measures into the domestic jurisdictions of 
the members states, are non-existent.263 With the exception of South Africa and 
Tanzania264, none of the SADC members have adopted legislative measures addressing 
the combating of organized crime as required by the Convention.   
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7.2.3 United States of America 
 
In  De Vries v The State265 ,Leach JA, found the POCA was largely modeled upon 
“RICO”266 statute  from which the definitions of “pattern of racketeering activity” and 
“enterprise” were directly taken. The jurisprudence of the United States is of 
considerable assistance in understanding why indictments are usually formulated in this 
way. 
 
Section 1 of RICO provides as follow: 
“The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States 
   Is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that 
   Annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful 
   Conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) 
   organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money 
   obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan 
   sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and 
   distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of 
   social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to 
   infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to 
   subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime 
   activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's 
   economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, 
   interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign 
   commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general 
   welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime 
   continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process 
   of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence 
   necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on 
   the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because 
   the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily 
   limited in scope and impact. 
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   ``It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title note above] to seek 
   the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening 
   the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new 
   penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies 
   to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized 
   crime.'' 
 
In addition, RICO also provides: 
Section 904 of title IX of Pub. L. 91-452 provided that: 
 `` (a) The provisions of this title [enacting this chapter and   amending sections 1505, 
2516, and 2517 of this title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes.” 
 
I submit a brief survey of the jurisprudence in respect of RICO will be reflective of the 
American Courts approach to organized crime. 
 
In United States v. Anderson267the court found : 
“The motivating policy of the Act, to free our nation's economic system from the tentacles 
of organized crime, does not even suggest that Congress intended the definition of an 
enterprise to encompass a simple association to commit the predicate crimes 
constituting the pattern of racketeering activity. An expansive definition of the enterprise 
element of the offense grossly disrupts the balance between federal and state law 
enforcement efforts, and brings within the ambit of the statute offenses which Congress 
did not consider sufficiently threatening to our economy to warrant federal intervention. 
Indeed, the primary purpose of RICO could be displaced. There is no indication that 
Congress ever intended to grant federal prosecutors the flexibility to pursue relatively 
minor offenders, having no connection with organized crime, who simply associate to 
commit two of the predicate crimes. 
We hold that Congress intended that the phrase "a group of individuals associated in 
fact although not a legal entity," as used in its definition of the term "enterprise" in 
section 1961(4), to encompass only an association having an ascertainable structure 
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which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal 
that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate 
acts constituting the "pattern of racketeering activity." 
In United States v. Turkette268 the Court remarked : In determining the scope of a 
statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the 
absence of "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive,” The Court reaches the following conclusion: “In 
view of the purposes and goals of the Act, as well as the language of the statute, we are 
unpersuaded that Congress nevertheless confined the reach of the law to only narrow 
aspects of organized crime, and, in particular, under RICO, only the infiltration of 
legitimate business. This is not to gainsay that the legislative history forcefully supports 
the view that the major purpose of Title IX is to address the infiltration of legitimate 
business by organized crime. The point is made time and again during the debates and 
in the hearings before the House and Senate. But none of these statements requires the 
negative inference that Title IX did not reach the activities of enterprises organized and 
existing for criminal purposes.’’ 
In US v Bledshoe269 This construction of the requirements that a defendant be 
"employed by or associated with" an enterprise and that he or she "conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs" through a 
pattern of racketeering has some support in the case law. Courts have held that 
predicate crimes which constitute "a pattern of racketeering" ..need not be related in any 
manner other than that they were perpetrated through an enterprise. ..Some courts have 
interpreted the statutory language requiring that a person be "employed by or associated 
with" an enterprise and "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
such enterprise's affairs" to require nothing more than any association with the 
individuals constituting the enterprise…The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute 
apply to insiders and outsiders — those merely "associated with" an enterprise — who 
participate directly and indirectly in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity…. Thus, the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest 
fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise.” 
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In United States v. Bagaric270, the Court considered an argument that the enterprise 
itself, rather than the predicate acts of racketeering, must be shown to yield financial 
gain The Court decided that: 
“The indictment and proof in this prosecution were consistent with the language and 
purposes of RICO. We decline to impose upon the Government an obligation to show 
pure or ultimate economic motive in any of the various formulations urged by appellants. 
Although we have previously noted, United States v. Huber, supra, 603 F.2d at 395-96, 
and we repeat the admonition here, "that the potentially broad reach of RICO poses a 
danger of abuse [when the statute is] appl[ied] . . . to situations for which it was not 
primarily intended," our obligation is "to rule on actual, as opposed to hypothetical, 
applications of the statute," United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1123 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980), and it is clear to us that 
the present one was appropriate.” 
It is reasonable to infer, from this absence of any textual identification of sorts of pattern 
that would satisfy § 1962's requirement, in combination with the very relaxed limits to the 
pattern concept fixed in § 1961(5), that Congress intended to take a flexible approach, 
and envisaged that a pattern might be demonstrated by reference to a range of different 
ordering principles or relationships between predicates, within the expansive bounds set. 
For any more specific guidance as 239*239 to the meaning of "pattern," we must look 
past the text to RICO's legislative history, as we have done in prior cases construing the 
Act…. The legislative history…shows that Congress indeed had a fairly flexible concept 
of a pattern in mind. RICO's legislative history reveals Congress' intent that to prove a 
pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering 
predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal 
activity…. Various amici urge that RICO's pattern element should be interpreted more 
narrowly than as requiring relationship and continuity in the senses outlined above, so 
that a defendant's racketeering activities form a pattern only if they are characteristic 
either of organized crime in the traditional sense, or of an organized-crime-type 
perpetrator, that is, of an association dedicated to the repeated commission of criminal 
offenses. 244*244 Like the Court of Appeals' multiple scheme rule, however, the 
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argument for reading an organized crime limitation into RICO's pattern concept, 
whatever the merits and demerits of such a limitation as an initial legislative matter, finds 
no support in the Act's text, and is at odds with the tenor of its legislative history. 
One evident textual problem with the suggestion that predicates form a RICO pattern 
only if they are indicative of an organized crime perpetrator — in either a traditional or 
functional sense — is that it would seem to require proof that the racketeering acts were 
the work of an association or group, rather than of an individual acting alone. RICO's 
language supplies no grounds to believe that Congress meant to impose such a limit on 
the Act's scope. A second indication from the text that Congress intended no organized 
crime limitation is that no such restriction is explicitly stated. In those titles of OCCA 
where Congress did intend to limit the new law's application to the context of organized 
crime, it said so. Thus Title V, authorizing the witness protection program, stated that the 
Attorney General may provide for the security of witnesses "in legal proceedings against 
any person alleged to have participated in an organized criminal activity.. And Title VI 
permitted the deposition of a witness to preserve testimony for a legal proceeding, upon 
motion by the Attorney General certifying that "the legal proceeding is against a person 
who is believed to have participated in an organized criminal activity...Moreover, 
Congress' approach in RICO can be contrasted with its decision to enact explicit 
limitations to organized crime in other statutes….. Congress drafted RICO broadly 
enough to encompass a wide range of criminal activity, taking many different forms and 
likely to attract a broad array of perpetrators operating in many different ways. It would 
be counterproductive and a mismeasure of congressional intent now to adopt a narrow 
construction of the statute's pattern element that would require proof of an organized 
crime nexus.” 
US v. Locascio271 the Court decided: “… although mere presence or mere association 
with conspirators is not enough, it's a factor that you may consider among others to 
determine whether a defendant was a member of the conspiracy. The defendant's 
presence may establish his membership in a conspiracy, if all of the circumstances 
considered together show that his presence was meant to advance the goals of that 
conspiracy. He must not only have been present, he must have known about the 
conspiracy, he must have intended by his presence to participate in the conspiracy or to 
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help it succeed. In other words, presence itself may demonstrate membership in a 
conspiracy only if that presence is a functional part of the conspiracy” 
 
7.3. Academic Views regarding POCA 
 
Kruger272 states the following regarding “knows or ought reasonably to have known”:“ 
Knowledge is attributed to someone who deliberately avoids establishing the truth of 
circumstances surrounding a transaction or even despite the flashing of warning lights 
that unlawfulness is involved or that the transaction is tainted   by illegality.  
The knowledge POCA requires –that the property forms part of unlawful proceeds-does 
not imply that the actual source need be known. It is submitted that, because of the 
content of section 1(2) and (3) of POCA; the accused need only have known that an 
offence had been committed, as is the case in the United States  
 
I agree with Kruger to the extent that the phrase of words captures the situation of an 
individual deliberately avoiding the truth of illegality. However, as apparent from the 
American case law and the Palermo Convention, this notion is far more reaching to the 
situation where an accused, aware of the grander scheme of   the enterprise, knows or 
ought reasonably to have known that his conduct is conducive or contributes to illegal 
activities of an organized nature. This is clear, when one takes into consideration the 
definition in section 1 of POCA of  ' pattern of racketeering activity' means the planned, 
ongoing, continuous or repeated participation or involvement in any offence referred to in 
Schedule 1. It refers to individuals partaking in a repetitious, ongoing, continuous and 
planned criminal activity, from employer to employee. An accused cannot escape 
liability, as the so-called “small fish” of an enterprise on the basis that he was not aware 
of the pattern of racketeering and the inner workings of these crimes. The fiction of 
“ought reasonably to have known” excludes this type of defense, in the sense that it 
does not matter whether he knew each and every detail or in fact any detail, as long as 
he was aware or ought to have been aware of the enterprise. 
 
                                                 
272 Albert Kruger, “Organised crime and proceeds of crime law in South Africa”First Edition(2008) 
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I therefore cannot agree with submissions, made by Burchell273that the extension of 
mens rea regarding POCA, has been extended to cover both negligence and intention. 
Furthermore, I cannot agree that this extension is questionable in terms of the current 
emphasis on subjective fault in South African law.274 
 
The same author states that the test for negligence in South African law requires a three 
part test to be applied by the Court275. First, would a reasonable person, in the same 
position as the accused have foreseen the possibility of the unlawful 
occurrence/circumstance? Secondly, would the reasonable person have taken steps to 
avoid/ guard against the possibility? Lastly did the accused fail to take reasonable steps 
to guard against the possibility? If all three questions are answered in the affirmative the 
accused can be regarded as negligent.276 This common law test of negligence cannot be 
equated the definition of POCA’s constructive knowledge, because the question of 
taking preventative steps to guard against the unlawful possibility by either the accused 
or reasonable person does not form part of POCA’s definition.  I submit that any 
argument assuming that negligence forms part of mens rea of POCA, is without 
substance, because the statutory definition of constructive knowledge does not contain 
the elements of the test of negligence. 
  
7.4 Conclusion 
 
From all the views held above and the language of international, as well as foreign 
instruments, I submit that from a comparative viewpoint, the importance of POCA cannot 
be overemphasized. POCA is the measure and means with which, the legislature has 
recognized our democratic state’s national, regional and international commitment to 
combating the transnational and international phenomenon. It is not a phenomenon 
which   South Africa experiences in its domestic law, but an issue which has received 
global recognition. This is a key aspect to take in account, in applying the value-laden 
approach to interpretation. It also is indicative of how POCA compares to global 
instruments and the type of principles and application of foreign jurisdictions that can be 
                                                 
273 Jonathan Burchell,”Principles of Criminal Law” Third edition(2006)P 977 
274 Burchell,(n 273)P 977 
275 See also Exton Burchell, Jonathan Burchell and Peter Hunt “South African Criminal Law and Procedure 
”,Volume 1,Third Edition,P275-278 
276 Burchell (n273) P525 
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taken cognisance of, when interpreting POCA.  The academic views are noteworthy to 
the extent that it illustrates that the secular reasoning that exists in common law is 
exactly the reason why measures such as POCA was introduced. The shortcomings of 
the common law, regarding concepts of the reasonable man, cannot be equated with the 
type of phenomenon that POCA is designed to eradicate. I submit that similarly to RICO, 
POCA must be liberally construed and applied to effectively combat, the ever adapting 
criminal element of organised crime. The interpretative process must take cognisance of 
especially these aspects, to make bold and constructive value-judgments in 
safeguarding the human rights, values and principles of our open and democratic 
society, based on human dignity, equality and freedom.  
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                                         CHAPTER 8 
 
              CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
8.1. Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I critically discuss the Savoi-judgment, with reference to the 
jurisprudential position nationally277and internationally; the academic views regarding 
POCA278 and the value-laden approach to the interpretative process279. The purpose of 
these discussions is to make recommendations on how POCA should be interpreted to 
determine the values underpinning the legislation. These recommendations seek the 
achievement of POCA principles; complying with democratic international obligations; 
effective combating of organized crime and protection of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of the members of our democratic society against the threat of organized 
crime  
 
8.2. Noteworthy findings of the judgment 
 
 Madondo J, remarks the following at par.52 to 54 of Savoi: 
“[52] The fundamental principle in statutory interpretation is that the purpose of the 
legislation must be determined in light of the spirit, purpose and objects of the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution. Where the law is clear  and  unambiguous, and in keeping 
with the Bill of Rights, the court must give effect to its meaning. See section 39(2) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 108 of 1996( the Constitution)…[53]The 
most important principle is to determine and apply the purpose of the legislation in the 
light of the Bill of Rights. The ordinary meaning must be attached to the words. See 
Union Government v Meck 1917 AD 419 .In Volschenk v Volschenk 1946 TPD486 it was 
decided that the most important rule of interpretation was to give words their ordinary, 
literal meaning. In Association of Amusement and Novelty Machine Operators v Minister 
of Justice 1980(2)SA 636(A)the Court held that this means colloquial speech. A meaning 
must be assigned to every word…[54]The intention of the legislation must essentially be 
                                                 
277 See Chapter  5 and 6  
278 See Chapter 7 
279 See Chapter 2 
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gathered from the language used. In Greenshields v Willemburg(1908)25SC,568, it was 
held that a court should not extend the meaning of the legislation beyond the words 
used. The court should give effect, to what the legislature has said, and not try to cover 
the eventualities that the legislature has, for whatever reason omitted to cover.” 
 
He continues in a declaration of unconstitutional invalidity at par.90 to 91: 
“[90]However, a person cannot be convicted on the ground that circumstances were 
foreseeable consequences of his conduct. The requirement that the accused ought 
reasonably to have known that his conduct would constitute an offense of racketeering 
calls for the application of an objective test in determining whether or not the accused 
“ought reasonably to have known”, because the fictitious reasonable person would have 
known that his conduct constituted racketeering activity. However, such a conclusion 
would constitute negligence and not dolus in any form ….This renders the accused 
exposed to a conviction for an offense he did not commit. In the circumstances, the 
possibility of punishing an unintended, insensible or unconscious conduct cannot be 
excluded, and that would in the decision in Humphreys’ case, supra, conflate different 
tests for dolus and negligence.[91] The same can be said for deductive reasoning on the 
ground that the process of inferential reasoning also starts from the premise ,that in 
accordance with human experience the possibility of the consequences ensuing would 
have been obvious to any person of normal intelligence .There is no certainty or 
constructive knowledge is a requirement for the contravention of section 2(1)(a)-(1)(g) of 
POCA. Such a confusion has the effect of rendering the provisions of sections 
2(1)(a)(ii),2(b)(ii),2(c)(ii) and (f) vague and unintelligible, and as a consequence such 
provisions are unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid to the extent only of the words 
“ought reasonably to have known” in each paragraph referred to above.”   
 
Also of importance is the following:[par.128]…On the whole POCA is a valid enactment 
under the Constitution and the Rule of Law. Since no finding has been made as to the 
interference of any of the constitutionally protected rights of the applicant, the need to 
balance the interests of the community against that of the applicants and the question 
whether or not the perceived infringement could constitute a justifiable limitation of the 
right of fair trial do not necessarily arise. For, not only the rights and values of the 
individual must be emphasised, but those of the community as well. This means that the 
constitutional state is not only involved in upholding and protecting the traditional 
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individual rights and values, but also has to establish re-affirm community rights and 
values.”  
 
8.3. Implications of the judgment 
 
Section 1 of POCA, defines the terms “ought reasonably to have known”: 
“(3) For the purposes of this Act a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected 
a fact if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would 
have been reached by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both-  
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of a person in his or her position; and  
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact has “ 
 
The term itself is used throughout POCA, i.e. section 2, 4, 5 and 6. Forfeiture 
applications on the basis of these sections are also lodged in terms of Chapter 5 and 6 
of POCA. The Savoi judgment, indirectly affects the validity of these provisions, because 
the same reasoning of Madondo regarding the validity of Section 2 of POCA, with 
reference to the term ‘ought reasonably to have known’, applies to these sections. 
Another implication is that, like section 2, the prosecution can only initiate proceedings 
with direct evidence that perpetrators intentionally committed the offences in section 4, 5 
and 6. Asset forfeiture applications, in terms of Chapter 5 and 6, based on these 
offences will have to meet the same standards. Strict liability based on dolus directus is 
required 
 
I submit that a third implication is that two key reasons for POCA stated in the preamble 
that the South African common law and statutory law fail to deal effectively with 
organized crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities and that it is usually very 
difficult to prove the direct involvement of organized crime leaders in particular cases, 
because they do not perform the actual criminal activities themselves, are ignored. The 
common law principles of culpa and recklessness are applied to legislation whose 
purpose and existence is owed to the very fact that South African common and statutory 
law had failed to combat organized crime enabling crime leaders to escape liability. 
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8.4. Fallacies of the judgment 
 
I submit that the first fatal flaw in the Savoi, finding is Madondo’s failure to address the 
applicant’s issue with regard to constitutional standing. The approach adopted by the CC 
in Ferreira v Levin NO280, i.e. that an applicant will have standing if there is an allegation 
that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened and; the applicant can 
demonstrate with reference to the categories listed in Section 38(a) to (e281) that there is 
a sufficient interest in obtaining the remedy they seek, is ignored.282 
From the judgment it is not quite clear, that the applicants  avers any specific right in the 
Bill of Rights have been infringed or threatened, nor is there any demonstration in terms 
of Section 38 that there is a sufficient interest in obtaining the remedy they seek. Applied 
to the facts, Madondo finds: “[par.21] In my view, the applicants are entitled to challenge 
the constitutional validity of the provisions of POCA under which they are currently 
charged. The said provisions are pertinent to the impending criminal trial proceedings 
against them. Accordingly, it follows that the applicants have a cause for concern or fear 
that their fundamental rights to fair trial may be infringed or threatened, presumably, by 
the unlawful conduct of the first respondent. They are, therefore, entitled to claim 
enforcement and protection of their fundamental rights.283” 
Not one fair trial right is alleged by the applicant, nor is any specific fair trial right referred 
to, by the learned judge. Section 35(3)(a) to (o) of the Constitution contains the fair trial 
rights of an accused person and not one of these rights are specifically referred to or in 
my submission, finds any application. I submit that a cause for concern or fear that their 
fundamental rights to fair trial may be infringed or threatened cannot equated with is an 
allegation that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened. Fear of 
anticipatory infringement or threats of a general unknown fair trial right, is far removed 
from an allegation of an actual infringement of a fair trial right, listed in the Bill of Rights . 
The applicants can neither claim enforcement or protection of any right in section 35(3), 
because it is unclear which right is to be protected or enforced. It could be a combination 
of the rights,  a particular right or even all of the rights.  
                                                 
280 Levine (n 23) 
281 The Constitution of 1996 
282 For full discussion see Johan De Waal, Ian Currie ,Gerhard Erasmus “The Bill of Rights Handbook” 
Fourth Edition, P84-85 
283 Page 8 
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This part of the judgment is vague and   its vagueness can easily be demonstrated. 
Section 35(3)(e) provides that “Every accused has the right to a fair trial, which includes 
the right..(e)to be present when being tried”. The obvious question would be, in what 
possible manner would POCA infringe on this fair trial right? I submit that this point 
illustrates the general manner in which the issue of standing was approach. The 
applicants should have failed on this issue from the outset.  
A second fallacy of the judgment is with reference to the remarks made by Madondo, 
which is also contrary to his finding with regard to his finding to standing of the 
applicants, at par 128284. The learned judge blatantly ignores the issue of limitation of 
rights, in the Bill of Rights, in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. If the court found 
that the right has been infringed, the respondent (usually the state, but sometimes the 
person relying on the validity of the legislation) may then seek to demonstrate that the 
infringement of the right is nevertheless permissible in terms of section of the criteria for 
a legitimate limitation of rights laid down in section 36.285 No attempt is made to perform 
a balancing act of the interests of the applicants and the state, in terms of section 36. 
This is despite and contrary to the approach of the CC, in National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice286, where the Court found that even if the 
respondent makes no attempt at justification, the court must nevertheless consider the 
issue of limitation.287 
I have submitted that no infringement or threat or infringement of the fair trial rights 
contained in the Bill of Rights, is present in this judgment, but even if one was to 
concede this point, the learned judge did not hear any arguments on the limitation clause 
or even consider the issue of limitation. This also contrary the principle of stare-
decisis288, in that Madondo was constitutionally obliged to consider this issue, because 
the Constitutional Court has mandated that it be considered289.  The High Court was 
bound by the CC' 
                                                 
284 Supra at note hh 
285 S v Makwanyane 1995(3) SA 391 (CC) 
286 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC)  
287 Par.33-57 
288 For full discussion see Lourens Du Plessis, “An Introduction to law,” Third Edition,P239-244 
289 National Coalition(note 286) 
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A noteworthy consideration, which is absent Madondo’s approach is the principle of 
avoidance. In S v Mhlungu290,Kentridge AJ stated : 
“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, 
civil or criminal ,without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should 
be followed.”291 
The CC has made its approach clear as to the principle of avoidance of constitutional 
issues and it is apparent from Savoi that the applicants simply alleged that POCA was 
unconstitutional for vagueness and over breadth allowing for arbitrary penalties292. The 
applicants never raised a substantive allegation or application that POCA legislation 
violates or threatens to violate any specific right contained in the Bill of Rights. The 
respondents contention in this matter that the applicants allegations were abstract and 
premature had merit and Madondo, should have at the least, addressed the issue as to 
why this matter could not have been finalized without the question of a constitutional 
issue. If Madondo decided against a constitutional issue being raised, this matter could 
have been finalized without further arguments regarding the constitutionality of POCA. 
The main flaw in Madondo’s approach and point of departure is regarding the 
interpretative approach that applies when interpreting legislation. It is quite clear, that 
according to Madondo’s approach the legislative purpose is to be sought from the 
ordinary meaning of the legislative text itself.  That the interpretative purpose is to be 
applied to give words their ordinary meaning to determine legislative intend and that a 
court cannot extend the meaning of words beyond their colloquial scope.  
 
I submit that this approach is in stark contrast to the approach that section 39 of the 
Constitution mandates. The approach that the CC has directed when utilizing the 
interpretation of statutes approach has been fully canvassed in S v Zuma293 . It is the 
same approach that has been advocated by Botha, Cockrel, Devenish ,De Waal, et al. 
The approach that Madondo applies, results in the interpretative approach to statutes 
being utilized to determine the legislative intent, by using the text of the legislation as 
                                                 
290 1995 (3)SA 867(CC) 
291 Ibid para 59; see also S v Melani 1995(4)SA 412(E); S v Eckert 1996(2) BCLR208(SE)210-
1;1996(2)BCLR174(E);Schinkel v Minister of Justice 1996(6)BCLR 872(N); S v Friedland 
1996(8)BCLR1049(W) 
292 Savoi(n 2)par a 13-14,P5-6 
293 Zuma, (n12) 
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yardstick for such determination. The CC and writers abovementioned advocates the 
notion that the statutory interpretative approach in our democracy must be used to 
determine the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. This approach applies irrespective of whether the 
Constitution is being interpreted or whether it is ordinary legislation being interpreted. 
This approach mandates that a deontic value judgment must be made, to determine 
what these values are and in making these determination aspects such as the legislative 
text, the language of the legislation, the drafting history of the legislation, the context294, 
the purpose, socio-economic impact, etc. are taken into account by the court. Once the 
value judgment has been made, the determination can be made whether the particular 
legislation or provision is contra the values of our democratic society.  If the legislative 
offends the values of our democracy and cannot be justified, either by an alternative 
approach that avoids a constitutional invalidity or even in terms of the limitation clause in 
terms of section 36 of the Constitution, then the legislation may be declared 
unconstitutionally invalid. If the issue is a matter pertaining to the Bill of Rights as 
contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution, as is the case in Savoi, a court must first 
determine the meaning of a provision in the Bill of Rights in order to establish whether 
law or conduct is inconsistent with that provision. First the meaning or scope of a right 
must be determined, and then it must be determined whether the challenged law or 
conduct conflicts with the right.  
8.5. Value-Laden Approach and Recommendations 
I have already submitted that no specific right in the Bill of Rights has been violated by 
POCA, based on the reasoning in Savoi. However for demonstrating the importance of 
constitutional interpretation and recommending the correct approach, that should have 
been followed, I will determine whether the phrase “ought reasonably to have known”  
contained in POCA, conflicts with fair trial rights, in terms of section 35 of the 
Constitution, on assumption that a constitutional issue has been raised. 
 I submit that the interpretative approach requires that several considerations be taken 
into account to make a value judgment.   
 
 
                                                 
294 See recent judgment of Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape v Prins 2012 (2) SACR 183 
(SCA) and Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] 2 All SA 262 (SCA) 
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8.5.1 Text and language 
 
The context of text and language itself of POCA may place the setting in terms of which  
POCA should be interpreted. The jurisprudence developed by our courts295 under 
POCA. The term “ought reasonably to have known” is used throughout the text of POCA 
to criminalize the conduct of would be offenders under several sections296. I submit that 
if one focuses on the Preamble of POCA phrase “AND BEARING IN MIND that it is 
usually very difficult to prove the direct involvement of organised crime leaders in 
particular cases, because they do not perform the actual criminal activities themselves, it 
is necessary to criminalise the management of, and related conduct in connection with 
enterprises” it is clear that POCA aims to prevent an accused charged with mere denials 
or defences of unwittingly partaking in serious crimes, because POCA recognises that 
the difficulty in proof is that accused in particular cases do not partake in the actual 
criminal activities themselves. A defense that the accused was not aware of an 
enterprise can easily be accepted if ordinary statutory and common law principles were 
to be applied.  
 
I submit that the ordinary principles of criminal law are too underdeveloped to adapt to 
the phenomenon of ordinary crime. The examples have been discussed in Chapter 4, in 
which the inadequacies of criminal law were illustrated in combating organized crime. 
Unfortunately, the common law, because of historical development could not have 
anticipated crimes that developed by a designed and organized nature. Criminal law 
could not anticipate the notion of a criminal enterprise. The Preamble of POCA is 
reflective of this in providing “AND WHEREAS the South African common law and 
statutory law fail to deal effectively with organised crime, money laundering and criminal 
gang activities, and also fail to keep pace with international measures aimed at dealing 
effectively with organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities”. It is 
thus concerning that the judge does not take this in consideration. The fact that one of 
the motivations for passing a legislative initiative such as POCA, is stated in its 
Preamble, i.e. that the Legislature has taken notice that the current legal principles of the 
country are inadequate and outdated to combat crime and protect society’s interests, 
cannot be ignored. 
                                                 
295 See Chapter 5 and 6, infra 
296 See section 2,4,5,6 of POCA 
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Furthermore if one looks at the definition of a pattern of racketeering, it is not a once-off 
crime, but a series of offenses 297.The seriousness of the offense of racketeering can be 
emphasized by focusing on Section 2(4) of POCA, providing: “A person shall only be 
charged with committing an offence contemplated in subsection (1) if a prosecution is 
authorised in writing by the National Director.” Section 1 of POCA states “National 
Director' means- (b) for the purposes of sections 2 (4), 71 or 72 the National Director of 
Public Prosecutions appointed as contemplated in paragraph (a) and includes a Director 
of Public Prosecutions, an Investigating Director of Public Prosecutions and a Special 
Director of Public Prosecutions referred to in section 1 of the National Prosecution  
(Act 32 of 1998, who is authorized thereto in writing by the National Director in a specific 
case or in general.” The offense itself has to be considered not by local offices of the 
prosecution, but by the National Director of Public Prosecutions or a Director of Public 
Prosecutions authorized thereto. It is an offense which attracts the attention of the 
prosecution authority at a national level and is to be carefully considered before 
prosecutions are instituted. I submit that this requirement cannot be ignored and is in 
fact a substantial consideration that the term “ought reasonably to have known” is a legal 
fiction that does not refer to negligence for purposes of POCA, if one considers the 
seriousness of the requirement of Section 2(4) of POCA. I submit that the Preamble also 
assists here as is evident from the phrase “AND BEARING IN MIND that it is usually 
very difficult to prove the direct involvement of organised crime leaders in particular 
cases, because they do not perform the actual criminal activities themselves, it is 
necessary to criminalise the management of, and related conduct in connection with 
enterprises which are involved in a pattern of racketeering activity.” 
 
8.5.2 International and foreign law 
 
The context of RICO statute and Palermo conventions, as discussed in chapter 7 are 
also indications of the seriousness with which organized crime is viewed from a 
comparative law perspective. It has been recognized by our courts298that RICO and the 
case law of the United States are of large assistance in interpreting POCA. I submit that 
noteworthy is the fact that in terms of RICO, the statute itself mandates that it be 
                                                 
297 See definition of “pattern of  racketeering” Section 1of POCA  
298 See De Vries(n 234) 
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interpreted liberally299 and states further in section 1 of RICO “(5) organized crime  
continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law 
inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal 
and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in 
organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government 
are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. If one takes into consideration the 
judgments of Locascio300 and Bledshoe301, I submit that objectives of the measures, 
such as RICO are clearly to attach liability to each role player in an enterprise and the 
easy technicalities available to offenders, in terms of ordinary criminal law are no longer 
there. POCA itself also recognizes that currently the rapid growth of organized crime is 
has caused that RSA’s ordinary legislation and common law is out of touch with the rest 
of the world, as mentioned in 8.5.1. I submit that it becomes so much more imperative 
that jurisprudence such as American case law be taken into account ,by the recognition 
that  South African Law fails to keep pace with international measures aimed at dealing 
effectively with organised crime, money laundering and criminal gang activities. By 
adopting such an approach , the role of international legal considerations are broadened 
in application of the value-laden approach. 
 
8.5.3 Purpose 
 
I submit that the Preamble of POCA captures clearly its purpose and the objectives it is 
designed to achieve and the term of “ought reasonably to have known, should in addition 
to the above-mentioned, be read in light of this background. I submit that these 
objectives have already been recognized by the CC itself as spelt out in POCA’s 
preamble.302I submit that the importance of POCA’s purpose and the balance that needs 
to be struck has been remarked on by the CC303 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
299 RICO (n 266) Section 904 
300 Locascio (n 271) 
301 Bledshoe(n 269) 
302 Mohammed 1 (n 197) 
303 See Prophet (n 171 ) and Vermaak(174) 
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8.6. Recommendations and Conclusion 
 
I submit that if one takes into consideration all of the above-mentioned factors , I cannot 
agree with Madondo’s finding that the possibility of punishing an unintended, insensible 
or unconscious conduct in terms of POCA, might ensue based on the words “ought 
reasonably to have known”.  
 
The business of a racketeering enterprise is acquiring interests through a pattern of 
racketeering. This pattern requires planned, ongoing, continuous or repeated 
participation or involvement in any offence referred to in Schedule 1 and includes at 
least two offences referred to in Schedule 1, in terms of S 1 of POCA.  I submit that a 
value judgment can be made that organised crime is an ever adapting phenomenon 
which does not focus on specifically one type of offense. It is an ever expanding criminal 
entity which commits a variety of offenses to achieve its financial objectives.304 I have 
already illustrated above through example 1 and 2 that ordinary criminal principles have 
not developed or fails to recognize this pattern or connectedness of these offenses. 
Ordinary principles of criminal law focuses on the criminal conduct of an offense in 
isolation, it cannot focus on all the offenses committed by larger operations and 
syndicates, i.e the planned, ongoing, continuous pattern. It is exactly these patterns, or 
methods of criminal entities that POCA attracts criminal liability to. The importance of 
this aspect of POCA cannot be overemphasized enough. 
 
The individuals partaking in these structures, conduct is equated with the pattern of 
racketeering and this determines whether they are charged in terms of S2(a), or S2(b) 
,etc. Their conduct determines the roles they play in the enterprise and the conducting of 
its criminal business.  A clear example of this is the United States judgment Bagaric305, 
illustrating the operations of a racketeering enterprise. See also commentary of the CC 
in Vermaak. 
I submit that similarly to RICO, our CC has and must continue to interpret POCA 
liberally. Liberal, in the sense that the CC recognizes the international, transnational and 
regional threat of organized crime, the importance of our democratic states commitment 
                                                 
304 See example 1 and 2 in Chaper  4 
305 Bagaric (n 270) 
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to our international agreements, such as the Palermo Convention306.  Liberal, in the 
sense that the CC takes cognizance of foreign legislation, such as RICO and the 
jurisprudence of other foreign jurisdictions, as was done by the SCA in De Vries307 
 
I submit that once this liberal approach is applied, the reasoning of Madondo, regarding 
the phrase “ought reasonably to have known” cannot be substantiated and must be 
rejected. The term does not refer to any form of negligence and I submit that no reading 
of the text of POCA, its language or context, supports such a view. Nothing in 
comparative case law, international law or RICO, supports such a finding. 
 
I agree that the notion of the reasonable person as the term “ought reasonably to have 
known” is a legal fiction, but I submit that to these two terms do not refer to each other. It 
is rather a legal fiction which eliminates the possibility of a role player in the grander 
scheme of the enterprise to escape POCA liability, by claiming that he did not know the 
operations of the enterprise. It is to ensure that even “the smallest fish” do not escape 
liability, but simultaneously, that a court applying a liberal approach will come to findings 
that role-players, especially criminal bosses, in elaborate organized criminal activities 
does not escape   criminal liability in terms of POCA. 
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